The US/Israel-Iran war is not simply a confrontation with the Shiite theocratic dictatorship in Iran and Iranian proxy forces such as the Houthis and Hezbollah engaged in combat operations. Iran’s patrons and supporters, primarily China and Russia, are of great importance in this situation. And there is no bigger supporter of Iran than Russia.
When war broke out on February 28 between Iran and the US, Israel and a number of Arab states, the immediate consequences were clear: fluctuating oil prices, attacks by Iran on tankers, hotels, airports and civilian targets in the Persian Gulf and Israel. The media around the world were bombarded with news of diplomatic consultations and the costs of the conflict, writes Forbes.
So far, Russia’s response has been subdued, but it will eventually be strategically significant. This is the first major test of the strategic agreement signed in January 2025 by Tehran and Moscow, which commits the two countries to long-term political, economic and security cooperation. It is the result of years of good relations and close cooperation, which include Russian assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs; sale of weapons; Iranian help for Russia to avoid sanctions and increasing the capacity of Russian drones in the war in Ukraine, etc.
The central question is no longer whether the Iranian regime and Putin’s Russia share a distaste for the West. They share it. The question is whether their cooperation, formalized through a long-term treaty aimed at deepening ties and countering external challenges, will withstand the current stress test. Will diverging priorities and US use of force nip their plans in the bud?
The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Iran and Russia institutionalized the relationship,
which the two countries have been developing for decades. Signed on January 17, 2025 and ratified by the legislatures of both countries, the treaty elevated the bilateral relationship to the level of a broad strategic partnership, the main principle of which is long-term efforts against external threats. Iran and Russia had already expanded their military-technical cooperation and energy coordination, especially in the nuclear field, as Moscow faced increasing isolation from Western markets. What was once tactical has become strategic, but this has not eliminated the friction arising from the differences in the agendas of Moscow and Tehran. The current conflict with the US and Israel deepens rather than bridges these differences.
Russia’s defense industry is heavily involved in supporting Moscow’s military efforts in Ukraine, and meeting export obligations is difficult. The Russian military systems that Iran has received appear to be second-rate. Tehran cannot count on unfettered access to modern Russian platforms, especially given that Moscow prioritizes systems critical to its own operational needs. Military transfers are therefore selective, gradual and politically calibrated.
Despite the vast amount of ground-based anti-aircraft systems that Russia has exported to Iran over the past 20 years, designed to deter exactly the type of warfare currently being waged, these systems have proven to be highly ineffective.
Russia’s much-vaunted C-200, C-300 and C-400 anti-aircraft systems have proven powerless against Western air power, as has Iran’s BAVAR 373 system, which was likely developed with Russian technology transfer.
Iran, along with Ukraine, has become the biggest testing ground for Western weapons systems against the Russian-Chinese weapons constellation. So far the results are obvious. Besides highlighting inadequate anti-aircraft systems, one of the most important elements of military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow is the reported deployment of advanced Russian electronic warfare systems in Iran. Defense reports confirm that variants of Russia’s Krasukha electronic warfare platform are already in service in Iran. The results are far from brilliant. Additional reports indicate that Israeli intelligence is closely monitoring these systems and assessing their potential operational impact.
The Krasukha system is designed to jam early warning aircraft, reconnaissance platforms and certain satellite systems. Instead of intercepting incoming munitions, electronic warfare is turning to the information architecture that enables precision strikes. Even partial degradation of radars and guidance networks introduces uncertainty, increases operational complexity, and alters deterrence calculations.
For Moscow, the transfer of military technology strengthens strategic ties and develops markets. Now the Kremlin has suffered a setback. For Tehran, the integration of Russian-origin systems would theoretically improve defenses without requiring the direct deployment of Russian troops. In practice, Russian systems require maintenance, training, spare parts and upgrades that Moscow cannot fully provide due to production pressures from the war in Ukraine. And even this does not explain the pitifully poor performance of Russian systems in the Iranian arsenal.
Both Iran and Russia are major hydrocarbon exporters that compete in overlapping markets. Energy coordination represents an even more complex dynamic. Both countries are sanctioned for regional aggression. Russia has benefited from higher global energy prices, especially during hostilities in the vital Persian Gulf. That is why Moscow is not interested in the lifting of sanctions against Iran. Iran could become a competitive pipeline supplier of natural gas to Turkey and Europe and has the potential to pump up to 6 million barrels a day, as it did during the Shah’s time, exporting 4.5 million barrels a day. This would drive oil prices to $50-60 per barrel, making many Russian oil fields unprofitable. If the next regime in Tehran seeks to expand exports and ease sanctions, Moscow will have little incentive to facilitate Iran’s rapid reintegration into global markets.
In the current scenario, Russia will gain directly at the expense of Iran. While Iranian oil is blocked in ports and Iran tries to cut off oil supplies from the Strait of Hormuz, Russia can continue to sell oil. Even if Russia cannot sell directly to the West, it will continue to supply India, Turkey and other buyers based on its own business and strategic priorities, not Iran’s program.
Moscow dreams of de-dollarization of the world economy,
even if this results in a system based on the yuan rather than the ruble. Iran’s greater integration into Russia-linked financial communication systems could gradually reduce dependence on Western-dominated clearing networks. However, Russia’s small economy and isolation limit the scale of what it can offer.
Even if the Iranian theocracy survives the current conflict without a deal with the Trump administration, this does not mean that the dollar will be immediately displaced or that existing global institutions will collapse. This points to gradual fragmentation: selective currency diversification and parallel trade channels that compound Western pressure. If the Iranian regime capitulates or falls, its successor is likely to cut ties with Russia.
After the strikes in February, Russia’s foreign ministry condemned the use of force and called for a de-escalation, calling the action a violation of sovereignty and international law. Russian diplomatic messages have highlighted the risks of wider regional destabilization and escalation, warning against actions that could widen the conflict.
Not only did this cause more amusement than fear, but Ukrainians know very well how the Russians feel about the inviolability of state sovereignty. Notable was the absence of the loud threats that often accompany Russian diplomacy. Moscow gave no signals of readiness for direct military involvement. Instead, he offered supportive rhetoric while avoiding getting involved.
This reticence reflects both strategic caution and limited options. Russia remains deeply involved in Ukraine and has little interest in provoking a wider confrontation with the US or Israel over Iran. Restraint could help Putin negotiate a better deal with Trump on Ukraine.
Fighting in Iran could help Russia’s economy given higher energy prices. By providing diplomatic support, Moscow reinforces its treaty commitments – or at least backs them up in words – without escalating its own military presence.
Russia’s current position is aimed at providing political support to Tehran without engaging directly on the battlefield, in a no-win scenario for Moscow. In a changing international order marked by escalating use of force, sanctions, competition, technological rivalry, and contested spheres of influence, moderate partnerships may prove more significant than formal military alliances. The Iran-Russia axis is a flexible arrangement designed to absorb pressure, diversify influence, and manage confrontation without open-ended commitments. It is also an uneven partnership that is broadly beneficial to Russia.
So far, the conflict shows that, regardless of what the treaty between Moscow and Tehran says, the alliance is operational and temporary, bound by mutual interests and profit, rather than permanent obligations that could lead to a confrontation between the nuclear powers of Moscow and Washington.
This happened Dnes, for the important things during the day, follow us and in Google News Showcase.
