The United States and European Union expanded funding for the Lobito Corridor railway project on May 12, 2026, to accelerate the export of copper and cobalt from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia. This infrastructure push aims to reduce reliance on Chinese-controlled logistics chains in Southern Africa.
The race for critical minerals has shifted from simple extraction to a struggle over logistics and processing. While the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia hold the world’s most concentrated deposits of cobalt and copper, the physical movement of these materials has historically favored Chinese interests. The expansion of the Lobito Corridor represents a direct Western attempt to break this monopoly by creating a high-capacity rail link from the mining heartlands of the Copperbelt to the Atlantic coast of Angola.
The Lobito Corridor and the Western Logistics Push
The Lobito Corridor project, backed by the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), seeks to bypass the congested ports of Durban and Beira. By connecting the mining hubs of Kolwezi in the DRC and the Zambian Copperbelt to the Port of Lobito in Angola, the United States and the EU aim to slash transport times and lower costs for minerals destined for Western battery plants.
Recent funding increases in May 2026 target the modernization of rail tracks and the digitalization of customs procedures. These upgrades are intended to make the corridor a viable alternative to the road-heavy routes that currently dominate the region. Logistics analysts note that the strategic value of the corridor is not merely economic but geopolitical, as it provides a secure supply chain that avoids the bottlenecks of East African ports where Chinese firms maintain significant influence.
The goal is to ensure that the minerals required for the energy transition do not flow through a single geopolitical straw. Diversifying the exit points for Congolese cobalt is a matter of economic security for the European automotive sector.
Marcus Thorne, Senior Analyst at the Global Resource Institute
The project also includes a diplomatic component, with the U.S. Department of State coordinating with the Angolan government to ensure long-term stability and transparency in the management of the rail concession. However, the success of the corridor depends on the DRC’s willingness to redirect its exports away from established Chinese buyers.
DRC Negotiations and the Sicomines Restructuring
In Kinshasa, the government is utilizing its mineral wealth to force a restructuring of long-standing agreements. The most significant of these is the Sicomines deal, a minerals-for-infrastructure
agreement with Chinese state-owned enterprises. The Congolese government has spent the last two years arguing that the original terms were skewed in favor of Beijing, providing insufficient infrastructure in exchange for vast mining concessions.
The Ministère des Mines (Ministry of Mines) has demanded a redistribution of the royalties and a more transparent accounting of the infrastructure projects promised under the deal. This tension has led to periodic delays in mining permits and increased scrutiny of Chinese-operated sites. The DRC is no longer content to be a raw material exporter; it is pushing for a greater share of the value chain to remain within its borders.
This shift in strategy coincides with a broader trend of resource nationalism. The DRC government has signaled that future contracts will require a higher percentage of local ownership and a commitment to build smelting and refining facilities on Congolese soil. This policy aims to move the country beyond the extraction phase
and into the industrial processing phase, though the lack of reliable electricity remains a significant barrier to this ambition.
Resource Nationalism in Zimbabwe and Namibia
The drive for local value addition is not limited to the DRC. Zimbabwe continues to enforce its ban on the export of raw lithium, a move designed to force mining companies to invest in local processing plants. The government in Harare argues that exporting raw ore is a colonial-era economic model that strips the country of potential industrial growth.
Zimbabwe’s policy has forced several Chinese lithium producers to accelerate the construction of refineries. While these plants have begun operations, they face challenges with consistency and quality control. The Zimbabwean government has warned that companies failing to meet local processing quotas will face revoked licenses.
Namibia has adopted a similar approach. The Namibian government passed legislation requiring a percentage of critical minerals to be processed locally before export. This policy specifically targets rare earth elements and lithium. By mandating local refining, Namibia hopes to attract foreign direct investment not just in mining, but in chemical engineering and metallurgy.
We are moving away from the era of simple extraction. The value of these minerals lies in their processed form, and it is only logical that the countries providing the resources should also capture the industrial benefits.
Johannes Namoloh, Ministry of Mines and Energy, Namibia
The Processing Gap and the Refining Bottleneck
Despite the infrastructure pushes and the nationalist policies of African states, China maintains a dominant lead in the refining stage. Even when minerals are extracted in the DRC or Zimbabwe, the vast majority are shipped to China for processing into battery-grade chemicals. This processing gap is the primary vulnerability in the Western supply chain.
The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) attempts to address this by offering tax credits for electric vehicles that use minerals extracted or processed in the U.S. or in countries with a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Because most African mining nations do not have FTAs with the U.S., the IRA has created a complex incentive structure. Mining companies are now lobbying their respective governments to secure trade deals with Washington to ensure their products remain competitive in the American market.
The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act follows a similar logic, setting targets for domestic extraction and processing while diversifying imports to avoid over-reliance on any single third country. However, the EU faces steeper challenges in environmental permitting, which has slowed the development of its own refining capacity compared to the rapid scaling seen in Chinese industrial zones.
The result is a fragmented system where the DRC, Zambia, and Zimbabwe hold the ore, the U.S. and EU hold the capital and the end-market demand, and China holds the technical capacity to turn the ore into a usable product. The scramble for Africa’s minerals is therefore no longer just about who owns the mine, but who owns the refinery and the railway.
The coming years will determine if the Lobito Corridor and the push for local refining can effectively decentralize the supply chain. If African nations successfully transition to processing their own minerals, the global power dynamic will shift from those who control the technology to those who control the source. Until then, the region remains the primary theater for a geopolitical competition defined by the requirements of the energy transition.
