In response to the attacks by Israel and the United States, Iran launched untargeted strikes on the territories of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan and Oman, in practice uniting a coalition of outraged Arab states against the authorities in Tehran.
The surviving ayatollahs apparently thought that these countries would respond to the attacks by putting pressure on the United States and Israel to end their bombing campaigns. However, this did not happen.
Iran wanted to raise the stakes and force its neighbors to respond. But something else is growing in the Gulf: political fury. Experts explain where this increasingly dangerous game could lead.
On February 28, a few hours after the first American-Israeli strikes on Iran, the armed forces of the Islamic Republic began retaliatory actions. Unlike June 2025, their target was no longer only Israel, but also Arab states.
This time, in addition to American bases, Iranian missiles and drones also began to hit civilian infrastructure: oil refineries, power plants, ports, airports, data centers and even hotels.
Of all the Gulf monarchies, Oman has so far suffered the least – a country that maintained its role as a mediator between Washington and Tehran almost until the last moment. Despite this, hits against tankers off the coast of Oman were reported, as well as an attack on the port of Duqm.
“Iran is well aware of this”
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Any disruption – whether from attacks on ships, increases in insurance premiums or restrictions on shipping – has an immediate impact on global markets. Of course, countries with access to alternative maritime transport routes are in a slightly better situation.
Strait of HormuzGoogle Maps/X
Saudi Arabia can partially redirect exports through the Red Sea, the United Arab Emirates can use the pipeline network, and Oman – located on the Indian Ocean – does not depend on the strait at all. However, countries such as Qatar may face serious problems.
It should also be remembered that the economic model of Arab monarchies has long been based on the image of stability, security and predictability. It was this image that attracted international banks, investment funds, technology companies and tourists to the region. As a result, the region has become one of the world’s most important financial, logistics and transport centers, connecting Europe, Asia and Africa.
A prolonged military campaign is undermining these foundations – and Iran is well aware of this.
Most Middle East experts believe Tehran decided to strike against Arab states to force them to put pressure on Washington to end its military campaign against Iran and to raise the stakes in negotiations — before the global economy suffers too much damage. The calculation seems to be based on the assumption that the monarchies will not be able to withstand a long war – and not only them, but also countries economically linked to them.
However, at least in the short term, Iran clearly miscalculated. Arab countries, which for many months have officially supported dialogue between Iran and the United States, condemned Tehran’s actions. Most importantly, the US-Israeli bombing campaign continues.
“Restoring the anti-Iran alliance”
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates issued joint statements with the United States calling the Iranian attacks “reckless and unjustified.”
“We reaffirm our right to self-defense against these attacks, underline our commitment to regional security, and highly value effective cooperation on air and missile defense that has prevented greater loss of life and destruction,” reads the text published on March 2.
Smoke in Doha, the capital of Qatar, after the Iranian attack, March 1, 2026.AFP/East News / East News
Other similar documents also emerged, including a declaration from all six Gulf Cooperation Council monarchies (including Oman, which did not sign the joint declaration with the Americans). Representatives from Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait also issued separate statements regarding the right to reply and/or self-defense.
According to Western diplomats often quoted by Israeli media, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and perhaps Qatar are “very close” to carrying out strikes on Iran — although they would likely be largely symbolic. On March 3, the Israeli television station N12 even reported that Qatar had already struck Iranian territory, although the authorities in Doha denied this. Nevertheless, such actions cannot be ruled out in the coming days.
At the same time, there are warnings in the region against direct participation in the war. Former Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani said that the Gulf states should not “get caught up in a direct confrontation with Iran” because it would exhaust their resources and allow “Israel to emerge from the conflict stronger.”
Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia during a meeting with President Donald Trump in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, U.S., November 18, 2025.Nathan Howard / POOL / PAP
In practice, this means restoring the anti-Iranian alliance that dominated during Donald Trump’s first term. However, if and when the Iranian threat is eliminated, the competition between two ambitious regional players — Saudi Arabia and the UAE — will most likely return.
“Concern of many countries in the region”
The fact that the attack on the British base was carried out by Lebanese Hezbollah and not directly by Iran does not change much. Hezbollah’s armed formations are Tehran’s main regional proxies. This is a separate problem both for the countries of the region and for Europe – primarily for France, which, together with the Arab monarchies and the United States, was the guarantor of the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah in 2024.
Hezbollah also attacked Israeli territory, creating the risk of retaliatory strikes that could plunge Lebanon into ruin again. The government in Beirut assures that it will deal with Hezbollah and appeals to mediators to stop Israeli airstrikes. However, it is difficult to expect this to be possible as long as the confrontation with Iran continues.
Perhaps Tehran did not want to lose Ankara’s political support, or perhaps it was afraid of a decisive response. The Turkish army is battle-hardened, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan is not known for his lack of determination. However, when Iran started firing missiles towards Turkish territory, all talks about neutrality became pointless. Regional instability will not spare Turkey – especially if the Kurdish factor comes into play.
Judging by recent publications, the United States and Israel may support the actions of Iranian Kurds against the regime. The main political and armed forces of the Iranian Kurds have had their bases in Iraq for many years. Just before the outbreak of the war, five Kurdish opposition groups announced the creation of the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan. Its declared goal is to fight “for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for the right of the Kurdish people to self-determination and for the creation of a national and democratic entity in Iranian Kurdistan, based on the political will of the Kurdish people.”
This raises concerns among many countries in the region. The Iranian opposition — from supporters of Shah’s successor Reza Pahlavi to supporters of the radical leftist organization People’s Mujahideen — has historically not been favorable to the Kurds. Türkiye, Iraq and Syria are also not interested in strengthening Kurdish separatist movements.
Ankara and Damascus have only recently managed to halt aspirations for broad autonomy in Syrian Kurdistan, and Washington has previously strongly opposed attempts by Iraqi Kurdistan to secede from the government in Baghdad. In short, Iran’s Kurds are unlikely to have much outside support — although the United States and Israel can nonetheless leverage their resources and temporarily strengthen them to weaken the regime in Tehran.
“It’s better to side with the stronger”
More broadly, current events force Arab countries to recall the experience of Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. In the years after the American invasion in 2003, Iraq experienced occupation, civil war, the threat of state collapse (mainly from Iraqi Kurdistan), war with the terrorist organization Islamic State, and the domination of armed pro-government formations linked to Iran. At the same time, political instability persists there to this day — with all the resulting economic consequences.
As some Arab experts note, the credibility of the security partnership with the United States remains unresolved for the Gulf monarchies. In 2019, Donald Trump’s administration did not respond militarily to an attack on Saudi oil installations, and later Joe Biden’s administration did not respond to Houthi attacks against the UAE. Similarly, last summer the Qataris were left stranded when their territory was successively shelled by Iran and Israel. Now, however, they have been drawn into the war and are suffering losses.
Moreover, it turned out that the diplomatic efforts of the Arab monarchies – reinforced by promises to provide trillions of dollars in investments to Washington – had no effect: in practice, the US-Israel partnership prevailed.
On the other hand, the question arises: what would the Arabs do now without American weapons? The answer is: not much, at least for now. However, it is possible that in the near future they will further intensify military and technical cooperation with Turkey, China and Pakistan.
The first lesson of this war for the Arab states – and for other regional players – is this: it is better to side with the stronger and avoid fighting old battles that have already been lost. At the same time, regional connections, the skillful use of all political levers at Arab leaders’ disposal, and their knowledge of local realities will continue to play an important role in further developments.
