Europe Defense Industry: A Real Strategy?

Jean-Louis Thiériot’s report entitled European Defense Industrial Strategy comes at the right time. In a Europe which is suddenly emerging from thirty years of “ peace dividend “, the very notion of ” defense industrial strategy » is invoked everywhere, rarely defined, and almost never assumed politically. By tackling this subject head-on, the MP – former Minister Delegate to the Minister of the Armed Forces Sébastien Lecornu – is proposing something other than just another text: an attempt to create coherence between the war returning to Europe, the fragility of our industrial and technological defense base, and the instruments, still in their infancy, that the Union intends to deploy – whether budgetary, financial or regulatory – under the label of “ European Defence Industrial Strategy » (EDIS).

Basically, the question is simple: does Europe want to give itself the means to create its own equivalents of Anduril or Palantir, or does it accept that the software and information backbone of its defense be permanently outsourced to American players?

The illusion of the American umbrella and its limits

From the first pages, we see that the author refuses to take refuge behind the comfort of incantations. Yes, we must produce more, faster, cheaper. Yes, we need a Europe “ power “. But still? Jean-Louis Thiériot forces the reader to ask the real questions: what capabilities do we really want, against whom, with what partners, under what political authority, and assuming what dependencies on the United States, NATO and financial markets?

We are far from the classic administrative exercise: the report – published on December 3 – takes a position, sometimes rough but useful, on the way in which Europe can organize its return to a war economy while preserving the sovereignty of States.

In the background, we find the continued rise in defense budgets since 2022, the return of high-intensity warfare, the growing pressure from the United States on the Europeans to “ take their part », the American pivot towards the Indo-Pacific and, now, the return of Donald Trump to the White House. In this context, the illusion of security guaranteed indefinitely by the American umbrella is eroding.

The consequence, Jean-Louis Thiériot formulates it bluntly: if the Europeans want to be taken seriously in the long term, they must be capable of arming, equipping, repairing and renewing their forces with primarily European means. Not out of an autarkic reflex, but because total industrial dependence on an ally – however close it may be – always ends up producing political vulnerability.

This is where EDIS comes into play: not as a magic wand, but as a framework, still vague, which could either strengthen this ambition or dilute it in a technocratic compromise. And it is precisely this risk that the report wants to ward off.

Getting away from the myth of “ internal market » defense

One of the merits of the text is to recall an obvious fact too often forgotten in Brussels speeches: defense is not a sector like any other. We are not talking about telecoms or agri-food, but about the capacity of States to wage war, to deter it, or to endure it.

Consequently, the logic cannot be that of a “ internal defense market » governed by the forces of competition alone, as some at the European Commission would like to imagine. The former Minister Delegate is clearly opposed to the idea of ​​a single defense market managed from Brussels, which would uniformly impose competition rules where States think first and foremost in terms of national security, industrial secrets and export control.

However, he does not defend the status quo. He pleads for an assumed European preference, intelligent, compatible with NATO, and capable of reconciling two often opposing imperatives: sovereignty and economic efficiency. In other words, it is not a question of closing our markets to American partners, but of preventing each major call for tenders from turning into a Trojan horse for additional dependencies, to the detriment of the European capacity to stand alone for the duration of a conflict.

This realism permeates the entire report: defense remains a sovereign competence, but industrial interdependence is a fact. We must therefore organize it, structure it, prioritize it, rather than endure it.

Do not entrust European defense to technocrats alone

At the heart of the text, we find a reasoned criticism of the possible drift of a European Commission tempted to take control of the defense tool in the name of the internal market, the green transition or competition rules. The report does not contest the legitimacy of the Union to act; he challenges the temptation to do so by circumventing the responsibility of States.

His line is clear: defense must first and foremost remain the responsibility of governments and national parliaments, including when they decide to use European instruments. The major decisions (which capacities, which programs, which partnerships) are the responsibility of political leaders, not of a purely technocratic logic nor of general management obsessed by budgetary orthodoxy and ESG (environmental, social and governance) dogmas.

In this perspective, NATO regains a central place. The Alliance sets standards, organizes interoperability, structures capacity planning. The Union must not seek to compete with it, but to complement it, by strengthening the industrial base which allows Europeans to fulfill their commitments within NATO without buying everything off the shelf in the United States.

Another important point: the place of the United Kingdom. The report is a useful reminder that London remains a major military and industrial power in Europe, like it or not. Obsession with the institutional framework should not lead to ignoring the need for pragmatic cooperation with the British, including outside the strict community perimeter.

Rearming the industrial base…and those who finance it

Where the text takes on a more original dimension is when it addresses the question of financing. Talk about “ defense industrial strategy » without talking about banks, markets and savings would be an abstract exercise. Jean-Louis Thiériot does not fall into this trap.

On the contrary, it describes the way in which part of the European financial system has gradually turned away from defense, in the name of ESG criteria which have sometimes become almost ideological, to the point of hindering the growth of even strategic companies. Cautious banks, investment funds that exclude defense from their portfolios, hesitant insurers: everyone sees the problem, but almost no one really takes it seriously on a political level.

The report therefore pleads for an assumed financial rearmament. This requires a clear public discourse: defense is not a sector “ sale » or morally doubtful, it is a condition for the survival of our democratic societies. But this also requires concrete instruments: targeted public guarantees, dedicated investment vehicles, relaxation of regulatory frameworks for retail banks, mobilization of long-term savings towards defense companies, including SMEs and start-ups in the ” New Defence ».

This point is crucial: the reinvention of the industrial base will not be done only by the great historical prime contractors. It will also involve smaller, innovative, often dual players who develop essential technological building blocks – from software to sensors, from cyber to space. They still need to find investors, recurring customers and long-term visibility.

War economy: shortening cycles rather than multiplying labels

The report also does not fall into the fetishism of innovation for innovation’s sake. He reminds us that the current fragmentation – between multiple European funds, national systems, incubators and accelerators – can generate as much confusion as dynamism. There ” New Defence » needs a readable environment, which clearly articulates research, prototyping, experimentation, then acquisition at scale.

The report emphasizes a point that is often avoided: if we really want to attract start-ups to defense, we must agree to shorten decision-making cycles, take the risk of failure, and finance demonstrators which will not all lead to a market. In other words, bringing the discourse closer to “ the war economy » of the reality of public purchasing procedures, still largely designed for a time of slow peace.

In this context, the major cooperative programs – SCAF, MGCS and others – are as much opportunities as tests. Succeeding in integrating more open architectures, common standards, modular building blocks usable by several manufacturers, would be a sign that Europe has understood the lesson of the current wars: it is not only the platform that counts, but the software ecosystem, the capacity for rapid adaptation, the modularity of payloads.

Make everyone face up to their responsibilities: State, industrialists, parliamentarians

It would be wrong to read the report as a simple contribution to a somewhat abstract Brussels debate. In reality, it also acts as a mirror for France. It highlights our strengths – a still dense industrial base, a state capable of planning, a robust strategic culture – but also our ambiguities.

France wants to be the driving force behind European defense, an industrial leader in several key segments, a reliable partner within NATO and an offensive exporter of equipment. Holding these four ambitions together requires a very clear political line, which is sometimes difficult to read behind the proliferation of speeches.

The merit of the report is that it forces us to clarify priorities. Do we first wish to consolidate European champions, even if it means accepting compromises on national industrial returns? Or do we prefer to preserve our decision-making autonomy, even if it means slowing down certain cooperative projects? Or choose to maximize NATO interoperability, even if it means accepting standards dominated by American manufacturers?

The report does not always decide, but it sets out the terms of the dilemma with enough frankness so that everyone – minister, industrialist, parliamentarian – is faced with their responsibilities.

Bringing the defense industrial strategy back into the democratic debate

Basically, the common thread of the report is this: defense can no longer be treated as a technical subject delegated to experts. The time when we could talk about “ European defense » by multiplying concepts (strategic compass, capability brick, autonomy, etc.) without confronting the question of power is coming to an end. By offering a demanding reading of the EDIS and formulating concrete recommendations, Jean-Louis Thiériot recalls that the defense industrial strategy is, above all, a choice of prioritization: prioritization of threats, partners, capacities, financing, industrial priorities.

It is neither grant management software nor a simple sectoral recovery plan. It is a framework which must say, in black and white, what Europe wants to be militarily in 2035, 2040, or even beyond, and how it intends to finance this ambition in the long term – including if the United States withdraws, if the crises add up, or if the pressure of the war on the borders continues.

This report is not only useful: it is intentionally uncomfortable. It calls into question certain well-established reflexes – the idea of ​​a Europe of defense which would advance in small steps, the faith in an internal market which would settle everything, the temptation to erase the political dimension of industrial choices

It remains to be seen whether this diagnosis will resonate beyond the circle of those familiar with the subject. This is undoubtedly the main challenge: to bring the question of industrial defense strategy out of the closed doors of commissions and conferences, to bring it back to where it should always be, at the heart of the democratic debate. Because ultimately, what EDIS puts at stake is not only the future of arsenals, design offices or shipyards. This is the answer to a simple question, which the report forces us to face: in a harsher, more uncertain, more violent world, how far are we prepared to go to remain masters of our security and with whom do we want to do it?

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