On the occasion of the Ministerial Meeting of the Celac-China Forum, we invite some experts to analyze what happened in Beijing and the scope for some of their countries.
Guest Specialists:
Norbert-Molina Molina, Center for Studies of Africa and Asia (CEAA) of the University of Los Andes. Venezuela
André da Silva Bueno, Rio de Janeiro State University. Brazil.
Sebastián Schulz, Chinese Studies Center, Institute of International Relations, National University of La Plata. Argentina.
Tatiana Gélvez, Universidad Externado. President Aladaa-Colombia.
From the investiture speech of President XI, do you identify new elements or only continuity in the model and road map of China’s vision for cooperation with the region?
André da Silva Bueno: I consider that China is developing a state project, in which integration with the South-South axis is a fundamental part of a new global geopolitical configuration in which China seeks to define its leading role. President XI has been an outstanding articulator in this regard, guaranteeing a consolidated expression of security and continuity for this project. It is difficult, in my opinion, to know if the new issues that are emerging in the dynamics of this relationship were no longer planned or if some of them arise as a result of complex movements, as in the case of the American pressure or the unexpected negative of Brazil to join the program of the strip and the route. They are points that arise over the years and that force adjustments to the original project.
Norbert-Molina Molina: We believe that there is a novel update with the incorporation of new systematized elements into five major programs that, in addition to economic issues such as trade, investments and finance, point to greater integration between China and Latin America, in the midst of an international environment nuanced by uncertainty and in which the Asian country seeks to promote multilateralism, the promotion of reforms to the reforms to the global governance system Cultural academics, tourism, assistance in areas such as security and development, new financing, among others. The matter is how to overcome the current division that CELAC faces for ideological reasons and how to attend an agenda like the one that China proposes to our region. Pragmatism is what we expect from this part of the world so that there are reciprocal benefits.
Argentina
With the decision of the Argentine government not to sign the final document of the ministerial meeting, what reading should this be given on the moment of the bilateral relationship?
Sebastián Schulz: The bilateral relationship between China and Argentina is going through one of its coldest moments in the last five decades. Although China maintains key financial agreements, such as the currency swap, the Argentine government has canceled or postponed strategic investments in sectors such as nuclear, hydroelectric, technology and aerospace energy, paying attention to the pressures of US officials. In this context, the link with China has moved towards the subnational sphere (provinces and municipalities) and between civil society actors, with agreements in university, cultural and sports areas.
Argentina is one of the countries that received the most money and projects in the region, does this decision affect the continuity of this?
Sebastián Schulz: It is highly likely that the new international positioning of the Argentine government affects the continuity and projection of Chinese investments in the country. Although the People’s Republic of China has expressed interest in consolidating the bilateral relationship, particularly in strategic sectors such as lithium and agri -food (soybeans and meat), the current rearrangement of Argentine geopolitical priorities could translate into a reconfiguration of the link. This is already evidenced in the paralysis, review or suspension of initiatives linked to cooperation in energy matters (nuclear, hydroelectric and wind), transport (rail and port infrastructure) and technological. In this context, even if certain key financial instruments are maintained, such as the coin swap, the scenario suggests a more fragmented relationship, with less strategic density and greater uncertainty in the medium term.
Brazil
Lula was one of the most important guests to this meeting. Chinese investments in Brazil have already been announced. Could this be considered a prelude to formalize the entry of Brazil to the Bri?
André da Silva Bueno: Brazil suffers a serious problem of political polarization and recurring difficulties in the organization of state projects. In addition, the Brazilian political class ranges between insecure, refractory or support the deepening of relations with China. It is a historical problem. Once again, the current government’s refusal to participate in the belt initiative and the route surprised most of China’s scholars in Brazil, who had been advising greater integration. It is possible, and many hope that Brazil escapes the domain of dollarized geopolitics and creates economic and political alternatives that guarantee more independence and equity. If President Lula will do it or not another issue, which depends on the consolidation of a project to approach China and that goes through a position of Brazil in the world, but still generates fear in much of the Brazilian political class.
What do you think the role of Brazil can be in the future of the Celac-China Forum and other promoted cooperation and multilateralism mechanisms By China, like the BRICS+?
André da Silva Bueno: Brazil – and more specifically the Brazilian political class – will finally have to decide between a leading geopolitical role or persist in a vision of colonized dependence. There is full potential in the country to play an important role of decision and organization in these spaces; However, it will depend once more on overcoming the indecisions of the eventual agendas and transforming the issue into a state project, valid for decades.
Colombia
On this occasion Colombia is one of the countries that have the greatest visibility, what perspectives are expected after the formalization of Colombia’s entry to the BRI?
Tatiana Gélvez: From the beginning of Gustavo Petro’s government, and due to his orientation towards ideas from the left, there was the expectation of a more determined approach between Colombia and the People’s Republic of China. However, during the president’s previous visits in 2024, this approach was still perceived as shy. This caution responded, in part, to the pressure exerted by sectors within the government itself and, especially, to the skepticism of the business, which tends to see the relationship with China more as a threat than as an opportunity.
However, the international context has begun to be transformed, particularly with the return of Donald Trump to the current presidency of the United States and the adoption of policies increasingly adverse to the traditional international order. This new scenario opens a window for Colombia to reconsider its geopolitical positioning, which could translate into a greater disposition to strengthen ties with China and explore mutual benefit alliances.
In this sense, the perspectives for the bilateral relationship seem more open. Initiatives such as the credit line for 9.2 billion offered to the CELAC member countries, together with new infrastructure investments, offer a specific opportunity for Colombia. Strategic projects, such as the modernization of the port of Buenaventura in the Pacific and the expansion of the port of Cartagena in the Atlantic, could find in China a key partner for their consolidation, thus contributing to the strengthening of the national logistics infrastructure and a greater commercial integration with Asia-Pacific.
Additionally, China is emerging as a strategic ally for Colombia on several key fronts. One of them is the modernization and technification of the agricultural sector, which could benefit significantly from the technologies and abilities developed by the Asian country, particularly in areas such as automation, the use of artificial intelligence and intelligent irrigation systems.
On the other hand, public policies implemented by China for the eradication of poverty – based on advanced information systems that allow precise targeting and continuous monitoring of the socio -economic conditions of the population – constitute a reference of great interest to Colombia. These experiences could offer valuable learning at a time when the country prioritizes progress in reducing inequalities and improving social inclusion mechanisms.
There are also opportunities for dialogue and cooperation in the development of capacities for the production of renewable energy, a field in which China has reached significant advances both in technology and scalability. To this is added the possibility of scientific collaboration in initiatives oriented to the preservation of strategic ecosystems, fundamental for environmental sustainability and the quality of human life.
This approach seemed like a turn in the link of Colombia, who had traditionally been closer to the United States, what effects could this bring? Do you think that Colombia can be entrusted into the confrontation between the United States and China?
Tatiana Gélvez: Naturally, Colombia’s approach to China in a context of growing geopolitical tensions between this country and the United States generates an uncomfortable scenario for the traditional relationship with the North American country. However, it is important to remember that there were already previous frictions, particularly due to the unworthy conditions in which undocumented Colombian migrants were deported from the United States. This fact caused President Gustavo Petro reactions, which in turn generated a negative response from the then president Donald Trump, who imposed tariffs on Colombian products. Although this measure was managed through diplomatic channels, it received a significant support from public opinion in Colombia, which interpreted it as a legitimate defense of national sovereignty and the dignity of its citizens. However, he also aroused uncertainty and concern in business sectors, which perceive these tensions as a risk to economic stability.
Another critical factor in this relationship is the role that international cooperation plays, especially through the US USAID agency, which until 2024 represented approximately 70% of the international aid received by Colombia with a focus on social development, the implementation of the peace agreement and the fight against drug trafficking. The significant reduction of this financing had already begun before the recent approach with China, generating a financial vacuum that will force the Colombian government to seek new allies for the continuity of these programs.
In this context, China could represent a strategic alternative both in terms of financing and in the implementation of development projects, in addition to offering new market opportunities for productive initiatives derived from these processes. This possible turn in Colombia’s foreign policy does not necessarily imply a break with the United States, but rather a commitment to the pragmatic diversification of its international alliances. It is about seeking a greater margin of autonomy and sustainability in its internal development agendas, especially in a scenario marked by the uncertainty generated by budget cuts and abrupt changes in North American cooperation agencies, which have affected the continuity of numerous social and peace projects in the country.
Venezuela
On that occasion, the presence of Venezuela and some other countries that have had bilateral work meetings have been highlighted, coupled with this, Venezuela is one of the countries that has received the most money from China, therefore, how should this Venezuelan presence be read in a complex context internally, regional and global?
Norbert-Molina Molina: Venezuela and China are currently supporting an alliance at the highest level, strategic to foolproof, as together they have called it. The complex situation of the country, and again the unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States, will undoubtedly reinforce this association, but with greater caution by Beijing seeking to obtain optimal results in the proposed plans and that do not affect their image in the region. The times of the big financing funds seem to have been left behind, while both governments seek to strengthen their areas of cooperation.
In your opinion, how is it expected that the Celac-China regional agenda be landed in the bilateral relationship between Venezuela and China?
Norbert-Molina Molina: Five major programs for their relations with Latin America in the coming years have been on the table. I am somewhat pessimistic with CELAC before the current fracture that the organism suffers with governments faced with each other for ideological reasons, very few pragmatic and unknown to the meaning of China today. In the Venezuelan case, although difficult to predict due to the complex situation imposed by sanctions and other internal factors, cooperation will continue to strengthen, perhaps not at the same level as other countries in the region, but with the rhythm imposed by the strategic association agreed through its high -level mixed commission.
