Eleven. So many judges have agreed to be included in the list from which the magistrate will be drawn at random to become a special prosecutor to investigate the Attorney General and his deputies. Eligible for the position according to the law are the acting judges of the Criminal College of the Supreme Court of Cassation or those of the district and appellate levels who have the rank of supreme. The condition is that they have worked as judges in criminal cases for the last seven years. More than 200 judges meet these conditions, i.e. only 6% of them are ready to join the special mechanism.
Anton Urumov – a judge from the Sofia City Court and a former special judge – was randomly selected today. However, this does not negate the questions of why the judges do not want to participate in the procedure.
Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that during the past 2 years, in which the first special prosecutor – Daniela Taleva, was in office, this mechanism was neither effective nor transparent. But its rethinking and repair are not on the agenda. Not only that, but there is even no will to correct technical gaps in the legal framework, which become additional obstacles to the mechanism. Thus, for example, the Code of Civil Procedure refers to a non-existent Art. 243a!
For 2 years
willing judges have halved.
Taleva was chosen from a list of 22 magistrates. Now there are only 11 left in the list maintained by the Supreme Court of Cassation. There were 12, but one resigned… Seven are from the Sofia City Court, two – from the Sofia Court of Appeal, and the remaining three – from the District Court in Varna. Among them and this time are the former president of the Union of Judges, Miroslava Todorova, as well as the former head of the closed special appellate court, Georgi Ushev. Last time, there were also applicants from Ruse and Yambol, from the Court of Appeal in Varna, as well as from the Supreme Court. Now there are none.
There are several reasons why the majority of judges shy away from the list.
If they are in good faith, they probably feel that as an ad hoc prosecutor they would be deprived of the opportunity to fulfill their duties to investigate thoroughly and objectively, because they do not really have autonomy. During Taleva’s time, we saw that she wanted the deputy. Prosecutor General (whom he must investigate if necessary) extension of the period of investigation against the Prosecutor General. Although such a request is completely unnecessary. It shares premises with the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office and uses its resources. Her vacations are probably also authorized by some of the people she investigates. We saw how and even when she was referred under the Access to Public Information Act, she hid under the skirt of the deputy. Attorney General. This makes it only logical that judges who would be on the roster to do work when needed would decline. It is needless to argue how much Taleva is the standard for a flawless ad hoc prosecutor, because it is clear that he is not.
She missed the chance to use the publicity in her defense and publicize what prevents her from being a full-fledged ad hoc prosecutor. Even
did not find it necessary to report
after his tenure…
Some magistrates with whom “Sega” spoke would not become an ad hoc prosecutor because they believe that the construction is initially wrong. Others believe that the law should not have allowed judges to have the right to choose at all – but to choose among those who meet certain conditions. This would avoid the risks of putting on the list mostly people driven by mercantile motives – because of the higher salary for not much work for 2 years, they will get rid of their current pending cases, as well as those who give consent so that they can later serve the attorney general. Looking at the current list, we may have reasonable suspicions that there are such people in it.
Another part of the judges who are eligible to be on the list but do not consent to be on it, must not want to spoil their comfort. After all, their “client” would be one of the most powerful people in the state, who can bring all its power to bear on them.
The chief prosecutor is still the same omnipotent and untouchable person as he was in the era of Nikola Filchev. It was precisely this inviolability that caused Bulgaria to be condemned in Strasbourg in the “Kolevi” case, on which there has been a decision since 2009. The authorities tried to respond to this decision by creating the mechanism for the investigation of the chief prosecutor. But the country is still under the scrutiny of the Committee of Ministers on how it implements it.
A week ago, the committee met again on the subject and
asked for guarantees that the mechanism was effective,
and the ad hoc prosecutor is independent from the chief prosecutor, his deputies and the Prosecution College of the Supreme Judicial Council. It will be hard to get them.
Borislav Sarafov, who continued to present himself as the acting chief prosecutor, not only requested the recusal of the judge who had to rule on the refusal to be investigated, but allowed himself to seek the recusal of every judge from the Union of Judges in Bulgaria who would agree to be elected as a special prosecutor. And by all accounts, Sarafov has no intention of stepping down as acting chief prosecutor. With his shrewd move to withdraw from the case at the Supreme Administrative Court in the case of the suspended procedure for his election as incumbent, he is actually trying to prevent the Constitutional Court from ruling against him on the changes to the Judiciary Act.
It is already clear that Taleva “bequeathed” an open file that the new special prosecutor will have to finish.
By the way, for these 2 years, no prosecutor was elected, who ex officio controls the actions of the ad hoc prosecutor. This can be a criminal judge from the Supreme Court of Cassation. This is precisely because of the insane mistake in the Civil Code to write that such a person is elected when the circumstances under Art. 243a… Which article does not exist. Interestingly, the Ministry of Justice deliberately did not find the time and will for this minor amendment for 2 years – to cross out the “a” so that only Art. 243.
There is no judicial control over the special prosecutor. What if the court pointed out to Taleva how shoddily she conducted the investigation on the BOEC report against Sarafov and how she refused to initiate an investigation without time. Well, it formed it and then terminated it immediately. With no authority to verify this termination. Wonderful.
The investigative mechanism will be effective, not when we see someone Attorney General behind bars. And when the public is convinced that, if necessary, the Attorney General and his deputies should be investigated, it will be done by an independent and honorable magistrate who has the tools and the freedom to act. And last but not least – who can publicly present and defend his acts. Citizens have the right to know whether the special prosecutor worked thoroughly and qualitatively, or whether his investigation was conducted absolutely pro forma. The rest is just dust in our eyes, the kind thrown at us for 2 years with Taleva.