Anduril, the $30 billion defense startup, has been making headlines.recent moves include a partnership with Meta to develop virtual reality devices for the U.S.Army,securing a $100 million contract to construct the Army’s command-and-control software, and becoming the third supplier of rocket motors to the U.S. government. The company is also a leading contender to help build the “Golden Dome” missile-defense system and has expanded globally, establishing offices in Seoul and Taipei.

The media has taken a keen interest. Dexter Filkins of the New Yorker, suggesting that “the future of warfare is being invented in places like ukraine,” endorsed the neo-defense tech dogma of building cheap massed weapons to deter China.He interviewed Anduril’s CEO, Palmer Luckey, and its head of defense strategy, Christian Brose, author of The Kill Chain. A Wall street Journal editorial featured extensive quotes from brose.

While Anduril and others in the neo-defense tech space are promising, the rapid convergence of opinions regarding the future of warfare warrants scrutiny.

The Allure of “Cheap Mass”

A primary concern is the assumption that cheaper solutions are inherently superior. The conflict in Ukraine, characterized by funding, personnel, and training challenges on both sides, is not directly comparable to a potential superpower conflict in the indo-Pacific region. For example, unmanned surface vessels provided a strategic advantage to Ukraine due to their short-range deployment capabilities and Russia’s shortcomings in surface warfare. in the Indo-Pacific, however, large, manned warships will be necessary to deploy unmanned surface vessels, and unmanned underwater vehicles cannot match the capabilities of America’s nuclear-powered submarines. Over-reliance on lessons from Ukraine could hinder the U.S. military’s ability to deter China.

“The future is not going to be five primes replaced by 100 contractors or 1000 medium-sized businesses. It will probably just be six or seven primes.”

Moreover, the economics of selling cheap hardware, even in large quantities, are challenging. While patriotic motives are present in neo-defense tech press releases, the business model requires constant consumption and replacement, which relies on major conflicts.Traditional defense contractors maintain production by exporting, but cheap, easily constructed items can be replicated by allies.

The Software-as-a-Service Model

The long-term profitability of neo-defense tech lies in software. The concept of “cheap mass” requires weapons to communicate, enabling numerous small units to defeat larger targets. Drones, missiles, and unmanned surface vessels need command-and-control systems, which become more complex as the number of weapons increases.

The future system-of-systems will rely on a single battle-management software or a few integrated suites. Companies like Anduril (“Lattice“), ShieldAI (“Hivemind“),Helsing (“Other“), and Saronic (“Echelon“) are developing such software. Despite the goal of integration through the defense standardization program’s “modular open systems approach,” a “zoo of systems” is not scalable or profitable.The business model involves attracting users with cheap hardware, then generating revenue through software licensing and updates. While hardware maintenance may provide additional income, software becomes the primary revenue stream, meaning “cheap” may not be cheap in the long run.

This does not invalidate neo-defense tech or its profit motives. Though, the business model is not primarily about job creation or winning wars, but about licensing and updating software.

The Need for Prudence

If neo-defense tech companies are essentially selling software-as-a-service, not all can succeed. The military does not need numerous competing command-and-control systems. The future will likely involve a consolidation to a few major players, not a replacement of five primes by hundreds of contractors.

While these companies offer valuable products, they also promote a narrative that should be questioned, especially given their potential for profit. It is important to assess whether the weapons used in Ukraine are truly beneficial for the United States and whether acquiring these weapons commits the nation to a specific combat approach.Skepticism is a form of prudence, a crucial element in warfare.