by Amelia Rodriguez | BUENOS AIRES – 2025/06/22 07:12:24

Argentina garnered significant international attention in 2024, primarily due to its staggering annual inflation rate (approaching 300%) and the ascendance of its new, divisive president, the ultra-liberal economist Javier Milei. Milei has responded to the economic crisis with shock therapy, including a structural overhaul of the state apparatus aimed at drastically reducing public spending and combating bureaucratic inefficiency. Consequently, his cabinet now comprises nine ministries (including the Cabinet Chief), a stark contrast to the 19 ministries under his predecessor, Alberto Fernández. While this streamlining of the goverment is politically and economically contentious, it doesn’t inherently pose a problem from a democratic theory standpoint, as the president is largely acting within his constitutional authority by reducing the size of the executive branch.

However, many scholars are expressing concerns about democratic stability in Argentina,primarily because Milei eliminated nearly 35,000 public sector jobs in 2024. These fears stem from broader questions about the concentration of power and the potential erosion of institutional checks and balances.

Decreasing Horizontal Accountability

Data indicates a decline in horizontal accountability, dropping from 0.81 in 2023 to 0.78 in 2024. This suggests that monitoring the Argentine government, especially through deliberative evaluation of its decisions, has become more challenging. Together, the president has seemingly gained more political power, with the index score increasing by 10 percentage points. According to the V-DEM CodeBook, this represents a normatively worse and less democratic situation. This growth is likely linked to Milei’s 50 emergency decrees (DNUs) issued during his first year, particularly concerning his economic program. The constitution permits these decrees in “exceptional circumstances” (Art. 99, inc. 3), and they do not initially require congressional approval. Milei is seemingly fulfilling his promise to Congress from March 2024: “We are going to change the country for good, with or without the support of political leaderswith all the legal resources of the executive.” The overuse of DNUs, coupled with a drastic economic policy, has been identified as a characteristic delegative phenomenon.

“We are going to change the country for good, with or without the support of political leaderswith all the legal resources of the executive.”

Judicial Independence Under Scrutiny

Interestingly, government attacks on the judiciary decreased significantly, from 2.16 in 2023 to 3.64 in 2024 (on a scale where higher values indicate fewer attacks). This suggests that the balance of power did not become more unstable.This is somewhat surprising, given Milei’s tendency to accuse public figures of elitism and corruption. However, he has generally been more restrained with the judiciary. Nevertheless, in December 2024, his administration threatened to appoint two judges to the Supreme Court by decree, including Ariel Lijo, who faced accusations of misconduct, sparking widespread outrage. This development necessitates a closer examination of judicial independence, which has declined significantly from 0.78 in 2023 to 0.63 in 2024 (on a scale of 0 to 1). While the V-Dem index contains various indicators that are only partially relevant,it’s worth noting that the government’s threat materialized. The executive order to appoint the two judges followed in February 2025, a move that will likely be reflected in future data. For 2024, the government’s softened tone towards the courts does not necessarily indicate an imminent collapse of institutional equilibrium.

The “Enfant Terrible” of Argentine Politics

Milei is undoubtedly an unconventional politician. Whether he possesses charisma is subjective, but his provocative and rebellious style aligns with the description of a political “enfant terrible.” The president himself, whose government he has repeatedly declared, in Trumpian style, to be the best in argentine history, is already convinced of his performance. While data is limited, trends in other contexts are revealing. In the U.S., the score rose from 0.89 in 2015 (Obama) to 3.26 (the highest score ever) in 2017 (Trump),while in Brazil it rose from 0.45 in 2018 (Temer) to 3.25 in 2019 (Bolsonaro). It’s plausible that only Juan Perón, the iconic Argentine political figure, would be considered more exceptional than Milei. This doesn’t necessarily imply that Milei is objectively a good leader,but rather that his persona is perceived as exceptional. However, the element of a strong leader in times of crisis can only complement the core concept, because every delegative democracy is personalistic (e.g., Argentina under Perón or Menem), but not every personalistic democracy is delegative. Thus, Milei’s eccentricity is an vital piece of the puzzle, but only in combination with the other pieces does a more or less complete reality of delegative democracy emerge.

Despite the perhaps bleak outlook for Argentina’s democratic trajectory, it’s crucial to contextualize the impact of Milei’s presidency, particularly concerning the delegative sphere. While his approach to political institutions is unconventionally harsh,it would be scientifically inappropriate to outright condemn it as problematic without a broader normative analysis. Argentina does have a corruption problem (ranking 99 out of 180 in the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index), so Milei’s ambitions to restructure institutions could stem from a desire to de-democratize the country, but do not necessarily do so.Moreover, the use of DNUs is not unprecedented in Argentina; Néstor Kirchner issued 236 DNUs during his four and a half years as president. This raises a critical question: Did Milei truly make Argentine democracy delegative, or just more delegative, suggesting that the high number of DNUs reflects a worsening of existing democratic dysfunctionality? Nonetheless, empirical results are concerning: the degree of “delegativeness” has increased in 2024, with less horizontal accountability and a more powerful president.Thus, although attacks on the judiciary decreased, Argentina’s recent democratic reality increasingly aligns with O’Donnell’s concept, which can now be analyzed quantitively for Milei’s first year. the question remains: what lies ahead?

Milei’s term ends on December 10,2027,with the possibility of re-election until 2031. Though, a change in leadership doesn’t guarantee a change in policy or polity. Future data will be crucial in assessing whether the downward trend in democratic quality continues, potentially leading Argentina back to being an archetype of defective democracy. Cautious optimism is warranted. Despite the sobering 2024 data, Argentina’s 1994 constitution limits presidential power, guarantees institutional resilience, and decentralizes political authority. In the “old era” of Caudillos and post-transitional Peronism, structurally undermining representative democracy was considerably easier. Hopefully, delegative democracy will remain a specter of the past, and Milei’s actions will not dismantle the imperfect but robust armor of contemporary Argentine democracy.