Darfur: A Crucible of Conflict and Change

Our narrative begins not in the halls of power in Khartoum,but in Darfur,a region spanning a fifth of Sudan’s territory,an area nearly the size of France. This diverse land, characterized by varying climates and terrains – from the fertile prairies of the south to the arid deserts of the north – has been a stage for ancient shifts and enduring conflicts. Darfur’s rich geographical and historical heritage, marked by the establishment of the Islamic Sultanate of Darfur in 1596, has shaped its identity as an autonomous political entity for centuries.

The region’s nomadic Arab tribes, such as the “Abala Tribe,” traditionally traversed the borders of Sudan and Chad freely.Though, droughts and conflicts, notably those in Chad from the 1960s to the 1980s, led to the displacement of numerous tribes into Sudan.among these was the Awlad Mansour family, belonging to the Maharian branch of the Rezaigat tribe, one of the region’s oldest and most influential.

Dagalo, the father, was a tribal leader in chad. His son, Juma, inherited this position and led the Olad Mansour tribe to North Darfur in the late 1980s. Facing non-recognition from local authorities, the family sought refuge in the South, where they were welcomed. They settled in areas formerly inhabited by the Fur tribe, renaming the place from “Dughi” (Fur) to “Umm al-Qura.”

The Making of Hmeti: From Camel Trader to Militia Leader

In the mid-1970s, Hamdan, Juma Dagaro’s elder brother, had a son named Muhammad, whom his mother affectionately called “Hmeti,” meaning “Little Muhammad.” Hmeti’s early life was marked by a departure from formal education. He dropped out of school in the third grade and embraced the traditional tribal lifestyle of grazing camels and trading across the borders of Sudan, Chad, and Libya.

He later expanded his business ventures into furniture and antiques, owning a prominent store in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur. Had the Darfur rebellion not erupted, Hmeti’s story might have ended there – as a dropout, a traveler, a camel merchant, and a small-time trader. However, the conflict dramatically altered his life trajectory and reshaped the geopolitical landscape of Sudan.

From Desert Roads to the Janjaweed: A Turning Point

Since Sudan’s independence in 1956, the nation has been plagued by prolonged internal conflict, including decades of civil wars and numerous coups. The uprising against Omar al-bashir in 2018 presented a rare moment of unity, with protesters chanting We are all Darfur, seemingly rejecting the traditional divisions between the central city and the marginalized regions.

This unity drew support from Darfur,the nuba Mountains,and the Blue Nile,reminding Khartoum residents of the horrors faced by these regions. Simultaneously, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a group largely composed of individuals from Darfur and inheriting the legacy of the infamous Janjaweed militia, began to gather in the capital.

Initially, Hmeti’s forces secretly supported the protests, defying Bashir’s orders to suppress the demonstrations. This move significantly boosted his support in the capital, despite his controversial past. However, people from Darfur and other conflict-ridden areas remained wary of his intentions.

Hmeti’s Ascent: A Calculated Strategy

At the end of 2018, the Sudanese people rallied in Khartoum, demanding the ouster of President Omar al-Bashir. Hmeti,once considered a protector of Bashir’s regime,carefully navigated his path during this period of upheaval. While often described as representing a marginalized group in conflict literature, Hmeti had previously allied with the central government, acting as a repressive force in marginalized areas, particularly in Darfur.

The excitement of the revolution attracted people from Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile to support the protest movement and reminded the people of Khartoum of the horror they faced.

Hmeti’s decision to support the protests, while seemingly opportunistic, positioned him as a key player in the post-Bashir era. his influence has as grown exponentially, making him a central figure in sudan’s complex political landscape. As of 2024, the RSF, under Hmeti’s command, controls meaningful economic resources and wields considerable military power, further solidifying his position.

The Legacy of Conflict and the Future of Sudan

The story of Hmeti is inextricably linked to the history of conflict and marginalization in Sudan. His rise to power reflects the complex dynamics between the center and the periphery, and the enduring challenges of achieving lasting peace and stability. The current political climate in Sudan remains volatile, with ongoing tensions and uncertainties surrounding the transition to a civilian government.

Understanding Hmeti’s background and his role in shaping Sudan’s recent history is crucial for comprehending the contry’s present challenges and potential future trajectories. His story serves as a reminder of the enduring impact of conflict on individuals and societies, and the importance of addressing the root causes of marginalization and inequality.

The Recurring Cycle of Uprisings and Military Intervention

Sudan’s history is punctuated by popular uprisings followed by military interventions.The nation has witnessed significant political upheaval, including the revolutions of 1964 and 1985, which ousted presidents Ibrahim Abud and Jafar Nimari, respectively. More recently, the 2019 uprising led to the military’s removal of President Omar Bashir, highlighting a persistent pattern of instability.

The Rise of tribal Militias as Government Proxies

Since the era of President Nimari, Sudanese governments have frequently employed armed tribal groups as proxy fighters. These militias have been used to combat insurgencies in marginalized regions, where movements frequently enough advocate for equitable growth and power-sharing. This strategy has exacerbated existing tensions and fueled prolonged conflict.

Exploiting Tribal Divisions: A Strategy of Control

Successive Sudanese regimes have capitalized on historical animosities between tribes, who often compete for scarce resources like agricultural land and pastures. By arming and supporting tribal militias, the government gained a tactical advantage over conventional military forces. These militias, familiar with the local terrain and adept at guerrilla warfare, proved effective against armed movements. Their mobility,utilizing four-wheel drive vehicles,contrasted sharply with the army’s slower,more conventional military strategies.

The state adopted a statement that was considered inflammatory, based on aggravated historical hostility among tribes, which essentially competed for resources such as agricultural land and pastures.

Historical Precedents: From Nimari to Bashir

The use of tribal militias dates back to the Nimari regime, which sought assistance from “pleasant tribal forces” to combat the southern Sudan rebellion led by Colonel John Garang.This approach was continued in the 1980s by Sadiq Mahdi, who established the Malahir militia. The Salvation army regime, in 1989, formalized this strategy by creating the People’s Defense Forces.

Bashir’s Reliance on Militias in Darfur

Omar al-Bashir adopted his predecessors’ tactics, focusing his efforts on Darfur. However, the consequences of his actions in the western region ultimately contributed to his downfall. In 2003, the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement launched a rebellion against the central government, citing political and economic marginalization of the region.

The Darfur Conflict and its International Repercussions

The Darfur conflict disrupted the Bashir government’s negotiations with the South John Garang movement, which had been making significant progress. These negotiations eventually led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, paving the way for south Sudan’s secession in 2011. The Darfur war quickly gained international attention, with Khartoum accusing Washington of exaggerating the conflict to divert attention from its military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Emergence of the Jingaweed Militia

The armed movements inflicted significant losses on the government, including attacks on the Falhir airport. This prompted Bashir to seek support from tribal leaders like Musa Hilal,of the Mahamid branch of the Rezaigat tribe,who had previously fought alongside the government during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). under Hilal’s leadership, the Jingaweed militia, meaning “devils on horseback,” was formed to fight on behalf of the government in Darfur. The Border Guard Intelligence Agency oversaw the organization and operations of the Jingaweed.

The Jingaweed primarily consisted of young men from Arab tribes, particularly the Mahamid and Maharia of the Rezaigat tribe, as well as immigrants from chad, some of whom were former rebels.

The Genesis of a Warlord: Darfur Conflict and the Rise of Hmeti

Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely recognized as Hmeti, is a prominent figure in Sudanese politics and military affairs. His ascent is deeply intertwined with the Darfur conflict and the subsequent formation of the rapid Support Forces (RSF). Understanding his origins requires delving into the complex dynamics of the Darfur region.

The Darfur conflict, a devastating period in Sudan’s history, raged untill 2008, leaving a trail of destruction and immense suffering. United Nations statistics estimate that over 300,000 people perished due to violence, disease, famine, or drought, and approximately 3 million were displaced both within Sudan and across its borders.Government officials and leaders of the Janjaweed militia, including some of Hmeti’s close relatives from the Orad Mansour family, faced accusations of genocide and war crimes at the International Criminal Court (ICC). Warrants were issued for President Bashir in 2009 and 2010,though these have yet to be enforced.

Amidst this chaos, Hmeti’s influence began to grow. One account suggests that an attack on his caravan, resulting in the deaths of 60 family members and the theft of his camels, drove him to join the Janjaweed militia.However, a contrasting narrative, detailed in a 2019 report by the Daily Telegraph, paints a different picture. According to a security and intelligence official involved in the investigation, Hmeti allegedly led a gang that targeted commercial convoys in the Darfur desert, stealing fuel and selling it to rebels. This account claims that hmeti and the officer were arrested by the National Intelligence and Security Agency.

Hermeti was tortured during his detention due to his accomplices trying to escape from prison. However, shortly afterwards, the officer was summoned to Khartoum and found that their former captives had been released, obtained uniforms from the National Intelligence and Security Agency and was persuaded to lead his gang against the rebels.

Sudanese journalist Neslin Malik, in a 2023 investigation published by The guardian, offered a similar account of Hmeti’s early experiences, drawing on sources from that period.

Regardless of the exact circumstances, Hmeti quickly established himself as a formidable warrior. One notable incident occurred on november 23, 2004, when he allegedly led an attack on the village of Adva in Southern darfur. Reports indicate that Hmeti commanded hundreds of Janjaweed militia members and government forces in an assault on the rebel-held North Darfur region, resulting in the deaths of 126 people. The Janjaweed militias were accused of using brutal tactics, including crushing civilians with trucks and raping women, actions that reportedly strained relations even with accompanying officers.

His effectiveness in suppressing the rebellion earned him the trust of key figures like Hilal and Bashir, solidifying his position as one of the most respected Janjaweed warlords by 2006.

from Rebel to Rapid Support: Hmeti’s Shifting Allegiances

As Hmeti’s power grew, so did his ambition. By 2007, he began to seek a more prominent role in Sudan’s power structure. This ambition manifested in an anti-government insurgency, documented by CNN’s “Meet the Janjaweed” program. In the documentary, Hmeti claimed that the government, under Bashir, had recruited and armed him to fight the rebels, asserting his men’s innocence regarding the crimes detailed in UN reports. His brother, Abdul Rahim Dagalo, also appeared, alleging government betrayal.

Researcher Jerome Tubiana,writing in Foreign policy,suggested that the Dagalo rebellion stemmed from a secret agreement with Chadian defense Minister Bikara Isa Jadara,a relative of Hmeti. This agreement allegedly stipulated that Hmeti would not fight against the rebellious movement in darfur, amidst tensions between the Bashir government and the Chadian government of Idriss Debi.

After six months of rebellion, Hmeti eventually reconciled with the government after reportedly shooting down a military helicopter. He was appointed as a consultant to the Nyaranan Darfur State Security Commission, receiving significant allowances and back pay for his soldiers.

We are not really a rebel. We just want to get the attention of the government and tell them that we are here to fight for our rights: military ranks, political status and development in our region.
Hmeti,in an interview with Jerome Tubiana for Foreign Policy

By 2008,facing increasing international pressure,the Bashir government sought to integrate the Janjaweed militias into the formal security apparatus. This marked a turning point for Hmeti, paving the way for his eventual leadership of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group that has since become a major player in Sudanese politics and security.

From Janjaweed to Rapid Support Forces: A Controversial Transformation

Despite the documented atrocities,the First Darfur War concluded with the deployment of the African Union and united Nations Joint Peacekeeping Forces.This intervention aimed to curb the operations of the Janjaweed militia in the Darfur region. Though, this marked not an end, but a transformation.

rewards and Reassignment: The Seeds of Power

Following the end of the First Darfur War, key figures like Hillal and Hmeti (Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo) were summoned to Khartoum. Hillal was appointed as a consultant to then-President Omar al-Bashir. Hmeti, despite lacking formal education, received the rank of brigadier general. This seemingly celebratory gesture masked a strategic maneuver by the Bashir regime.

Simultaneously, Hmeti was tasked with leading a group of militias in a counter-insurgency operation, extending into Chadian territory.The mission aimed to destabilize President Idriss Déby’s regime, accused by Khartoum of supporting rebels in Darfur. By late 2009, this strategy appeared accomplished, culminating in an agreement where both sides pledged to cease support for each other’s rebels, improving relations between Khartoum and N’Djamena.

Consolidation of Power and a New identity

Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo’s effectiveness in Darfur and Chad solidified his position within Khartoum’s power structure.Though, the Janjaweed’s brutal reputation remained a liability. As Hmeti himself stated in The New york Times, he was unhappy with the Jingaway label, which he described as ‘roadbones’ who will rob you on the road. It’s just the propaganda of the opposition.’ To distance itself from this legacy,the Bashir government established the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in 2013,integrating them into the National Intelligence and Security Agency.

This move officially transformed the Janjaweed militia into the Rapid Support Forces,an attempt to shed its terrifying past. Hmeti, promoted to general despite lacking formal military academy training, was appointed commander of the new force. Simultaneously occurring, Musa Hilal was removed from his advisory position.

Expansion and Repression: The RSF’s Growing Influence

The Rapid Support Forces rapidly evolved into a formidable entity, equipped with mobile units and heavy weaponry. Their mandate expanded beyond Darfur to include combating insurgency and suppressing threats to the regime in Southern Kordofan,the Blue Nile state,and even the capital,Khartoum. During the September 2013 uprising, the RSF faced accusations of killing 185 protesters demonstrating against Bashir’s austerity policies.

By 2012, the Rapid Support Forces were redeployed under a new name, but with the same cruel means.

Gold, Conflict, and the second Darfur War

Less than two years after the Doha Peace Agreement, renewed conflict erupted in the region, triggered by the finding of significant gold deposits in Mount Baniamel and other areas.Khartoum viewed this gold as a replacement for lost oil revenues following South Sudan’s secession. Though, securing control proved challenging. Local tribes resisted, and Musa Hilal, feeling marginalized, formed the “Revolutionary Awakening Committee” to control some mines. Simultaneously, the “Revolutionary front,” a coalition of armed movements against Bashir, escalated its actions, seizing the town of Abu Karsaura in 2013.

The Rapid Support Forces, now officially recognized with ID cards issued by the National Intelligence and Security Agency, gained legal immunity and the status of a “regular force.” Hmeti expanded his forces by recruiting fighters from various tribes and foreign entities, reaching an estimated 6,000 soldiers and 750 vehicles by February 2014. In December 2014, Bashir formally declared war on Darfur’s “insurgency,” effectively invalidating the role of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). This marked the beginning of the “Second Darfur War,” led by Hmeti, which included the “Decisive Battle of Summer 1 and 2” campaigns from 2014 to 2015.

The Genesis of Power: Darfur and the Rapid Support Forces

The story of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hmeti, is inextricably linked to the conflicts in Darfur. His rise to prominence began amidst the turmoil of the region, eventually leading him to become a dominant figure in Sudanese politics and economics. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), initially established in 2013 under the Bashir government as part of the National Intelligence and Security Agency, served as the vehicle for his ascent.

However, the RSF’s actions have been marred by allegations of severe human rights abuses. International organizations,including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International,have documented alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the RSF during various operations. These include mass killings, rape, torture, forced displacement, and the plunder of property.Amnesty International’s report, Scorched Earth Policy, Poisoning the Air, detailed a chemical weapon attack allegedly launched by Hmeti’s troops, with the support of the Sudanese Armed Forces, on Jebelmala in 2016, targeting non-Arab groups, particularly the Fur tribes, in what the organization described as potential genocide.

Further research by Eric reeves has highlighted demographic shifts and systemic rape in darfur, documenting a substantial archive of racial violence, including an estimated 1,000 cases of killings, forced displacement, and village destruction. These reports paint a grim picture of the RSF’s involvement in the Darfur conflict and the human cost of Hmeti’s rise.

consolidating Influence: From Military Leader to Economic Mogul

Hmeti skillfully leveraged the chaos of war to consolidate his power. He eventually orchestrated the overthrow of Moussa Hilal, a rival military figure. In 2017, Hilal was apprehended with Hmeti’s assistance and detained in Khartoum, solidifying Hmeti’s position as the most influential military leader outside the formal military structure.

By the end of the Second Darfur War, Hmeti and the RSF had become a formidable force within the Bashir regime. In a move designed to protect his regime from insurgents and potential rivals, Bashir enacted a law in 2017 integrating the RSF into the armed forces, directly under presidential control. This decision circumvented resistance from military leadership who opposed the RSF’s practices and influence. The law also promoted Hmeti to lieutenant general, allowing his troops to be formally stationed in Khartoum and other Sudanese cities, equipped with heavy weaponry, ostensibly to protect the regime. Some reports even suggest that Bashir’s relationship with Hmeti became exceptionally close, with the president reportedly referring to him as My Protector.

The Economic Empire: Gold, Power, and Sanctions

Hmeti’s influence extends far beyond military power.He has built a substantial economic empire centered around control of the Jebel Amel gold mine, a key factor in the Second Darfur War. Leaked documents reveal that the RSF enjoys financial independence, operating with its own bank account and not relying on state funds.

The cornerstone of Hmeti and his family’s economic empire is the company Junaid, named after the grandfather of the Rezaigat tribe. Officially, the company is owned by three members of the Dagalo family: Hmeti’s brother, Lieutenant General Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo, and his sons, Adel and ala Abdul Rahim. Hmeti himself has also served on the company’s board of directors.

A 2019 investigation by Global Witness, with the involvement of the late Egyptian journalist and researcher Mohamed Aboul Gheit, exposed junaid’s intricate financial network.The report detailed how the organization controls a significant portion of the country’s gold mines, including Jebel Amel, and uses state-owned banks and companies as fronts for cross-border operations, effectively separating its economic activities from the Sudanese treasury. This allows the RSF to operate with considerable financial autonomy.

In mid-2023, following renewed conflict, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on Junaid, confirming these findings. The Treasury’s decision stated that Junaid Diversification Activities Co., Ltd. is a Sudan holding company controlled by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commander of Rapid Support Forces and his brother, deputy Abdul Rahim Dagalo. These sanctions highlight the international scrutiny of Hmeti’s economic activities and their connection to the RSF.

The Meteoric Rise of Hmeti and the RSF

Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hmeti, has experienced a remarkable ascent from a camel trader to a dominant figure in sudanese politics and security. His command of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has transformed him into a key player, wielding significant influence both within Sudan and across the region.

From Darfur to National Power

The RSF’s origins trace back to the conflict in darfur, where they were initially formed as a militia. Over time, they have evolved into a powerful paramilitary force, deeply entwined with Sudan’s economic and political landscape. The RSF’s control over key economic assets, particularly gold mines like the Jebel Amel Mine seized in 2017, has provided a substantial revenue stream for Hmeti and his forces.

Regional Influence and Controversial Alliances

Beyond Sudan’s borders, the RSF has become a significant actor in regional security dynamics. The deployment of RSF troops to Yemen in 2015 and their support for General Khalifa Haftar in Libya underscore their expanding reach. However, their involvement has also been mired in controversy, particularly concerning human rights abuses and alleged involvement in migrant trafficking.

EU Funding and Allegations of Migrant Exploitation

Notably, the European Union has faced scrutiny for its engagement with the RSF in efforts to curb migration from Africa to Europe. Reports, including an investigation by the Klingendal Foundation for International Affairs, suggest that the EU provided substantial funding to the Sudanese government in exchange for cooperation on immigration control. The New York Times reported allegations that the RSF was involved in exploiting migrants, selling them to traffickers who subjected them to torture, ransom demands, and even slavery.

The EU paid 200 million euros to the Bashir government between 2016 and 2018 in exchange for its cooperation on immigration.
Klingendal Foundation for International Affairs

Economic Expansion and Military Growth

The RSF’s influence extends beyond military operations into a diverse range of economic activities. Through Junide, a conglomerate associated with Hmeti, the RSF has expanded into transport, infrastructure, construction, mining, and even the camel trade, reflecting their origins and consolidating their financial power.

Unprecedented Growth Under Bashir

This economic and military expansion fueled an unprecedented growth in the RSF’s size and capabilities. professor Alex Deval notes that the RSF’s strength increased tenfold during the later years of the Bashir regime, reaching an estimated 70,000 soldiers and a substantial fleet of armed vehicles. Despite this growth, the command structure remained largely unchanged, dominated by members of the Darfur Arab tribe under the Dagalo family.

Navigating the Fall of Bashir

As public protests mounted against Omar al-Bashir’s 30-year rule, hmeti recognized the shifting political landscape and strategically positioned himself for the post-Bashir era. While seemingly aligned with the regime, Hmeti understood the need to secure his accumulated power and influence.

Strategic Maneuvering in the Transitional government

In the aftermath of Bashir’s ouster, Hmeti focused on solidifying his position within the transitional government. He initially opposed the transitional military commission led by Defense Minister Awad Ibn ov, fearing limitations on his ambitions. Though, he later agreed to join the commission as vice-Chairman, securing a promotion to Lieutenant General and becoming the youngest officer to hold that rank in the Sudanese army.

Alliance with Burhan

Hmeti’s alliance with Lieutenant General Abdel Fatah Burhan proved crucial in navigating the transitional period. Their relationship dates back to the First Darfur War in 2003, and their cooperation was further strengthened during the 2015 Yemen War, where Burhan oversaw operations involving the RSF.

burhan and Hmeti cooperated well in Darfur.
Majak D’Agoot, former head of Sudanese intelligence

This strong relationship was evident in video clips from 2017, showing the two discussing the crackdown on armed rebellion in Darfur. Their continued collaboration has shaped the political landscape of Sudan,with both figures wielding significant power and influence.

The Contested Image of Hmeti in Post-Bashir Sudan

Following the ousting of Omar al-Bashir,Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo,commonly known as Hmeti,has become a central figure in Sudan’s turbulent political transition. His actions and pronouncements have fueled intense debate,resulting in sharply divided perceptions of his role in the country’s future. Was he a sly opportunist, a reluctant revolutionary, or a pragmatic power broker? The answer, it seems, is complex and multifaceted.

Three Schools of Thought

The Sudanese public and political observers are largely divided into three distinct camps regarding Hmeti’s motivations and actions:

1. the Converted Ally: This group believes Hmeti, initially a tool of Bashir’s regime, recognized the irreversible momentum of the revolution and ultimately sided with the people. They point to his supposed refusal to use violence against protesters as evidence of his genuine support for change. Hmeti himself has actively sought to reinforce this narrative.

2. The Bashir Extension: This faction views Hmeti as a continuation of the old regime, arguing that his apparent reluctance to suppress protests was merely a calculated move born of political expediency. They believe he understood the futility of resisting the revolutionary wave.

3. The Pragmatic Necessity: This camp adopts a more cautious approach, warning that Hmeti’s immediate removal could trigger a devastating civil war, jeopardizing the fragile gains of the revolution. They advocate for a gradual approach to managing his influence, recognizing that Hmeti’s primary goal is self-preservation amidst the revolutionary fervor.

Courting Public Support: A Calculated Strategy

In the wake of Bashir’s removal, Hmeti actively sought to cultivate public support through a series of highly visible actions. He visited hospitals to comfort those injured during the December 2018 Revolution, assuring them that he would not authorize the dispersal of protesters, directly addressing widespread rumors. Moreover, he made a public appearance announcing the release of hundreds of debtors from Cobb Prison, pledging approximately $780,000 (35 million Sudanese pounds) to settle their debts. During this visit, he also advocated for a review and strengthening of the police force.

Beyond these symbolic gestures, Hmeti pledged over $1 billion to the sudanese Central Bank, claiming it was intended to bolster the national economy. When questioned about the source of these funds, he cited “wages for soldiers fighting abroad, and also gold and investment,” raising eyebrows and sparking further scrutiny.

From Leniency to Repression: A Shifting Security Strategy

Hmeti’s approach to security has been characterized by a fluctuating mix of leniency and repression. While civilian forces engaged in power-sharing negotiations with the Transitional Military Commission, protesters continued to demand an elected government, staging a sit-in in front of the Army General Command.It was at this juncture that Hmeti issued a stark warning, stating that “there is also a limit to patience,” signaling a shift towards a more authoritarian stance.

the consequences of this shift were devastating. On June 3, 2019, the sit-in protest was violently dispersed, resulting in the deaths of over 125 people.Media reports indicated that personnel from the Rapid Support Force (RSF), allegedly under Hmeti’s command, spearheaded the operation. Disturbingly, some soldiers were reported to have shouted, “We bring Darfur to you,” a chilling reference to the brutal conflict in the Darfur region.

In the aftermath of the massacre, Hmeti attempted to distance himself from the violence, claiming that the perpetrators were imposters wearing RSF uniforms. Though, these denials were widely met with skepticism, particularly in light of his well-documented involvement in the Darfur conflict.

Khartoum may become Qatam, a village where residents of Darfur have disappeared.

Hmeti, warning against further protests

An investigation committee was established to probe the events of June 3rd, but its findings have yet to be released, fueling further distrust and suspicion. Ultimately, political considerations led to a reconciliation and a political agreement, effectively burying this bloody chapter of the Sudanese uprising – at least for the time being.

The Constitutional Framework: Power Sharing and its Discontents

On August 21, 2019, the Constitutional Document was unveiled, outlining a power-sharing arrangement between the Transitional Military Commission and civilian forces represented by the Forces of Freedom and Change. This agreement led to the formation of the Transitional Sovereignty Commission, with Lieutenant General Abdel Fatah Burhan assuming the role of chairman. Hmeti was appointed vice president, a position not explicitly defined in the document but considered customary. Abdullah Hamduk was appointed as prime minister.

Looking Ahead: Hmeti’s Enduring Influence

Hmeti’s journey from a commander in Darfur to a key player in Sudan’s transitional government highlights the complex and often contradictory forces shaping the nation’s future. His ability to navigate the turbulent waters of Sudanese politics, adapting his strategies and alliances as needed, underscores his enduring influence. Whether he will ultimately be remembered as a force for progress or an obstacle to genuine democratic reform remains to be seen. The ongoing investigation into the June 3rd massacre,if ever fully revealed,could significantly impact his legacy and the future of Sudan.

From Militia Leader to Political Player: Hemedti’s Transformation

Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, has undertaken a calculated transformation from a militia leader to a prominent political figure in Sudan. This evolution has been marked by strategic alliances, public relations campaigns, and the consolidation of economic and military power.

Initially, Hemedti focused on cultivating a favorable public image. He distributed resources,including bonuses to teachers and promises of rewards to striking workers. In Darfur, he presented himself as a reconciliatory figure, providing vehicles to tribal leaders. his role in the Juba peace negotiations with armed movements,once his adversaries,further enhanced his international standing.

Simultaneously, Hemedti expanded his influence by heading the Emergency Economic Commission, effectively diminishing the role of civilian leadership under Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. This move allowed him to control vital economic levers within the transitional government.

The Global Stage: Image Building and International Relations

Hemedti’s ambitions extended beyond Sudan’s borders. He launched a comprehensive global publicity campaign to bolster his image,engaging international lobbying firms and seeking support from various countries.

A key element of this strategy involved a 6 million dollar contract with a Canadian lobbying firm, Dickens and Madson, helmed by Ali Ben-Menash, a former Israeli intelligence official. This partnership underscores Hemedti’s willingness to engage with diverse international actors to advance his agenda.

Furthermore, Hemedti actively courted the international media, opening a large headquarters in Khartoum to host foreign journalists. He presented a narrative of himself and his forces as saviors of the country from chaos, aiming to shape international perceptions of his role in Sudan.

His outreach extended to Arab nations and, notably, Israel. In early 2020, Hemedti openly expressed his desire for Israeli support, stating, Frankly, we need Israel, we are not afraid of anyone, and praising Israel’s development. this paved the way for Sudan’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords, facilitated by the Trump governance, leading to Sudan’s removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Reports suggest that Hemedti sought independent interaction channels with Israel to enhance his standing among Sudanese rivals,particularly burhan and Hamdok. Meetings between Mossad officials and Rapid Support Forces generals in Khartoum further highlight these efforts.

Controlling the Narrative: Disinformation and Online Influence

Recognizing the power of digital media, Hemedti invested in controlling online narratives. Social media platforms like Facebook have taken action against networks of accounts linked to the Rapid Support forces for promoting pro-Hemedti content.

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFR Lab) has documented instances of these accounts employing disinformation tactics, masquerading as independent media outlets while disseminating propaganda favorable to Hemedti.This strategy aimed to manipulate public opinion and solidify his support base.

the 2021 coup and its Aftermath

By October 2021, hemedti’s influence had reached a zenith. Capitalizing on growing public discontent with the Hamdok government and divisions within the Forces of Freedom and Change, he coordinated with General Burhan to seize power.

On October 25, the military staged a coup, arresting prime Minister Hamdok, suspending constitutional documents, and declaring a state of emergency. This action was met with widespread protests denouncing the coup as a betrayal of the December Revolution.

Under immense domestic and international pressure, Hamdok was reinstated a month later but resigned in January 2022, citing his inability to achieve a political consensus. This resignation plunged Sudan into further uncertainty.

In the subsequent year, Sudan’s political landscape became increasingly complex, with regional and international actors attempting to mediate between the conflicting parties. In December 2022, a “framework agreement” was signed by the military, Rapid Support forces, and civilian forces, outlining a new two-year transition period. However, Hemedti, sensing a potential trap, began to realign alliances, seeking closer ties with civilian forces in planning for future power struggles.

The Current Situation and Future Prospects

As of today, Sudan remains in a precarious state. The power struggle between Hemedti and other factions continues to shape the country’s trajectory. The ongoing instability has severe consequences for the Sudanese people, exacerbating economic hardship and hindering progress towards democratic governance.

the international community faces the challenge of supporting Sudan’s transition while navigating the complex web of internal and external interests.A sustainable solution requires inclusive dialog, respect for human rights, and a commitment to civilian rule.

The future of sudan hinges on the ability of its leaders to prioritize the needs of the people over personal ambition. Only through genuine collaboration and a shared vision can Sudan achieve lasting peace and stability.

Archynetys.com Editorial Board

The Seeds of Discord: A Reassessment of Power Dynamics

Before the eruption of open conflict, a silent power struggle was brewing in sudan between General Burhan, head of the Sudanese army, and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemeti, commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This tension, escalating since the October 2021 coup, involved strategic maneuvers by hemeti to consolidate his influence across various sectors.

Expanding Influence: Hemeti’s Strategic Control

Evidence suggests Hemeti was actively expanding his control over key government and private institutions.Reports indicate the formation of a team, estimated between 5,000 and 8,000 individuals, strategically placed within banking, trade, and media organizations. This move allowed Hemeti to exert considerable influence, particularly within media outlets aligned with the RSF.

These personnel were reportedly compensated handsomely, with monthly salaries reaching up to 34 million Sudanese pounds (approximately USD 750,000). The concentration of these resources within RSF-affiliated media suggests a purposeful effort to shape public opinion and consolidate power.

Diplomatic Independence and regional Maneuvering

Further fueling tensions, Hemeti operated with increasing independence from the Transitional Sovereignty Commission, led by Burhan. This autonomy extended to diplomatic relations and foreign visits. Notably, Hemeti’s visit to Eritrea a month before the outbreak of hostilities was interpreted as an attempt to secure regional support. According to reports,Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki questioned Hemeti about his animosity towards the army,but received unsatisfactory answers.Hemeti also reportedly expressed interest in importing agricultural technology from Israel.

Economic Commission and Public Scrutiny

hemeti’s appointment as chairman of the Emergency Economic Commission proved to be another point of contention. The commission’s failure to address critical issues like the power crisis and economic recession led to public criticism, a situation some believe the military leadership orchestrated to undermine Hemeti’s standing.

Undermining Hemeti’s Base: The Release of Musa Hilal

In March 2021, Burhan’s decision to release Musa Hilal, a rival of Hemeti, further escalated tensions.Hilal’s return to darfur, Hemeti’s tribal stronghold, and his subsequent rebuilding of the “Revolutionary Awakening Committee” were perceived as a direct challenge to Hemeti’s authority and social base.

The Framework Agreement: A Breaking Point

The signing of the “Framework Agreement” proved to be a decisive turning point. Hemeti reportedly realized that the agreement’s implementation would lead to the integration of his forces into the Sudanese army on a timeline unfavorable to him. While the military leadership aimed for integration within two years, Hemeti sought a ten-year timeframe to secure his interests and maintain his influence. He viewed the shorter period as a forfeiture of his gains.

Afterward, Hemeti publicly declared that the “Framework Agreement” was the root cause of the conflict, despite having initially welcomed and signed the agreement.

Preparing for Conflict: Military and Media Strategies

In anticipation of the impending conflict, Hemeti appears to have undertaken systematic preparations, including reorganizing military, logistical, and media operations. In late 2022,he contracted Zero Gravity to implement a new communication strategy and engaged the French agency Think Doctor to enhance his image among European policymakers and manage the Rapid Support Force’s Wikipedia page.

Military Buildup and External Support

Militarily, Hemeti significantly strengthened his forces, bringing them to an estimated strength of 100,000 personnel, comparable to the Sudanese army in terms of numbers and equipment.He also secured strategic support from regional and international actors, most notably the Russian Wagner Group.The Wagner Group allegedly facilitated gold smuggling and provided Hemeti with advanced weaponry,including surface-to-air missiles,from Russian military bases in the Central african republic. This external support significantly bolstered the RSF’s capabilities and contributed to the escalating tensions.

the Current Situation: A Nation in Crisis

The culmination of these factors has plunged Sudan into a devastating conflict. As of today, the fighting continues, with significant humanitarian consequences. Understanding the power dynamics and strategic maneuvers leading up to this crisis is crucial for comprehending the complexities of the situation and seeking a path towards lasting peace. The international community is closely monitoring the situation, with calls for a ceasefire and a return to negotiations.

According to the United Nations, the conflict has already displaced hundreds of thousands of people, creating a severe humanitarian crisis. The fighting has also disrupted essential services,including healthcare and food supplies,further exacerbating the suffering of the Sudanese people.

The Shifting Sands of Power: RSF’s Initial Ambitions and Evolving Strategy

The ongoing conflict in Sudan, now entering its second year, has seen the Rapid support Forces (RSF), led by Hmeti, achieve notable tactical successes on the ground. Though, these gains are overshadowed by allegations of widespread human rights abuses and a failure to achieve their initial strategic objectives.

Initially, Hmeti’s plan centered on a swift and decisive takeover. The strategy involved eliminating the military leadership, headed by Burhan, on april 15, 2023. This was predicated on the RSF’s element of surprise and their significant troop presence in Khartoum, ostensibly deployed to safeguard national sovereignty and key infrastructure. Hmeti believed the army,weakened by the transitional period and the disbanding of the Sudan Intelligence Agency Operations Agency,would be unable to mount effective resistance. This elite unit, numbering around 13,000 soldiers trained in urban warfare, had previously resisted Hmeti’s attempts at recruitment, preferring demobilization rather.

In the days leading up to the conflict, the RSF strategically increased troop deployments within Khartoum and reinforced their position in Melovi, a northern city. This occurred against a backdrop of perceived neglect and inadequate preparation within the Sudanese army.

However, the initial plan to neutralize the military leadership faltered. Burhan, after being besieged for five months, managed to escape to Port Sudan, which was subsequently declared the country’s temporary capital. This setback forced Hmeti to recalibrate his strategy, shifting towards a plan to exert full control over Sudan by isolating the military leadership in specific regions, primarily around Port Sudan and the eastern and northern states.

After a year of fighting,the RSF has made significant territorial gains,controlling a majority of Sudan’s 18 states. The Sudanese army’s presence is largely confined to a handful of states, with their troops remaining under siege in various locations, including the capital. The RSF has consolidated its control over these besieged positions.

Controversies and Allegations: Human Rights Concerns and International Condemnation

Despite their battlefield successes, the RSF’s operations have been marred by widespread allegations of human rights violations, documented by international organizations and confirmed by foreign agencies. These allegations have drawn strong condemnation from international bodies and governments.

The U.S. Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee issued a statement condemning the RSF’s alleged genocide against Sudanese civilians.The former U.S. President Joe Biden administration imposed sanctions on Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo “Hmeti”, accusing him of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide, supported by joint reports of human crime and war crimes.

The International rescue Committee estimated in mid-2024 that these alleged atrocities have resulted in approximately 150,000 deaths. Millions of Sudanese citizens have been displaced from their homes, seeking refuge from the violence. This has created what the United Nations describes as the world’s largest displacement crisis, with estimates suggesting that around 14 million people have been displaced. The International Rescue Commission estimates a higher figure of 25 million displaced.

Beyond displacement, the RSF has been accused of employing sexual violence and starvation as weapons of war, as well as widespread looting and robbery perpetrated by individuals associated with the group. These actions have further exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in Sudan.

Sudan has also experienced widespread destruction targeting infrastructure and civilian institutions, including universities, government buildings, and even the National museum of Sudan.These acts of vandalism and theft have inflicted significant damage on the country’s cultural heritage and essential services.

According to estimates from the Sudanese Ministry of Trade, the economic losses resulting from the war are substantial. The conflict has severely disrupted economic activity,further compounding the challenges facing the Sudanese people.

External Support and Intelligence Capabilities: Unanswered Questions

Recent reports have raised concerns about the RSF’s access to advanced weaponry and intelligence capabilities. Images have surfaced indicating that the RSF possesses Israeli-made LAR-160 rocket launchers, prompting questions about potential support from Israel, despite Tel Aviv’s official declaration of neutrality in the conflict.

Furthermore, the RSF’s intelligence capabilities have reportedly been enhanced through their relationship with the Wagner Group. The Wagner Group has allegedly provided the RSF with access to satellite imagery obtained from a chinese company. Additionally, the Hebrew-language newspaper Haides reported that Hmeti’s forces have acquired highly encrypted Israeli spy technology to conceal their operations, although the details of how they obtained this technology remain unclear.

Political Maneuvering: Reconciliation Efforts and Shifting Alliances

Amidst the ongoing conflict, Hmeti has also engaged in political maneuvering, seeking to strengthen ties with civilian forces, particularly the Forces of Liberty and Change – the Central Committee, a key party within the framework agreement.

Hmeti’s relationship with the military underwent a significant shift in August 2022 when he publicly denounced the October 25 movement as a mistake in an interview with the BBC. This marked a clear break with the military leadership and set the stage for the subsequent conflict. Following the outbreak of war on April 15, 2023, Hmeti initiated actions against the army with the stated goal of removing Burhan from power.

The Humanitarian Catastrophe Unfolds

The situation in Sudan has deteriorated into what the United Nations describes as one of the most severe humanitarian crises of our time. As the conflict intensifies, Sudan’s representation to international bodies has presented compelling evidence implicating regional actors in providing military assistance to the forces loyal to Hmeti, the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This support allegedly includes the provision of weaponry and the recruitment of foreign mercenaries,further destabilizing the region.

Hmeti’s Quest for Legitimacy: A Multi-Front Campaign

Facing a decline in his domestic standing, hmeti has embarked on an extensive diplomatic offensive aimed at securing international legitimacy. This campaign is crucial for him to maintain his position amidst ongoing accusations of war crimes and a perceived lack of a coherent political strategy.

Courting International Favor

Hmeti’s efforts have included travels to numerous African capitals, where he has sought to cultivate regional support and project an image of himself as a capable future leader of Sudan. dressed in formal attire, he attempts to present a stark contrast to his image as a warlord.

Reaching Out to Israel

Expanding his outreach, Hmeti’s political advisor, Youssef ezzat, has reportedly engaged with Israeli media, echoing sentiments critical of Hamas, similar to those expressed by Sudanese military officials. This move signals a potential shift in alliances and a desire to gain favor with Western powers.

European Diplomacy

Ezzat also undertook a diplomatic tour, visiting officials in Paris, London, and Berlin. His mission was to portray Hmeti as a viable leader for a future civilian government and as a bulwark against Islamist and extremist influences in Sudan. This narrative aims to position Hmeti as a necessary partner for stability in the region.

Forging Alliances and Political Maneuvering

To compensate for the absence of a well-defined political platform, Hmeti has sought political alliances, including an understanding reached in Addis Ababa with the “Progressive” Alliance, a coalition of civil groups led by former Prime Minister Hamduke.This alliance is seen as an attempt to broaden his support base and gain credibility among civilian factions.

Hmeti several times desire to announce his willingness to conduct regional and international mediation with the troops to implement a new equation in which the Rapid Support Force and Hmeti is made up of his military superiority on the ground.

The Army’s Response: Rebuilding and Resistance

In response to hmeti’s advances, the Sudanese army has been actively rebuilding its forces, strengthening regional alliances through arms procurement and recruitment. They have also reactivated operational agencies and opened doors to popular volunteerism, which has garnered significant support from various segments of Sudanese society. Furthermore, armed movements, particularly in Darfur, have formed “joint forces” to combat Hmeti and the RSF.

Turning Tides: The Army’s Strategic Gains

As September 2024, approximately a year and a half after the outbreak of the conflict, the Sudanese army has achieved notable strategic gains. They successfully crossed a crucial bridge from Ntuman, a key area for their bases and supply lines east of the Nile, into Khartoum Bari and Khartoum. This marked a significant shift in the balance of power.

The Sudanese army continued to advance, from Senal to the White Nile on the island, which began to restore the states one by one, while strengthening its defense on the Blue Nile on the border with South Sudan.

Mount Moya debacle and Hmeti’s Accusations

The RSF’s significant defeat at Mount Moya,a location of strategic importance,was highlighted by a video showing Hmeti making confused and unsubstantiated claims.He alleged conspiracies involving various actors, from Iran and Eritrea to regional and international powers like Azerbaijan and Ukraine. He even accused the Sudanese army of receiving support from American bombs, demonstrating a sense of desperation and a lack of clear strategy.

The Escalating Humanitarian Crisis: A Call for Action

The ongoing conflict has had a devastating impact on the Sudanese population. According to recent estimates by the UN, over 8 million people have been displaced, and more than half of the population requires humanitarian assistance. The healthcare system is on the brink of collapse, and food insecurity is rampant. The international community is facing increasing pressure to provide urgent aid and to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

The Mercenary Factor: Fueling the Flames of War

Reports indicate a concerning trend of mercenary recruitment from various countries to participate in the Sudanese conflict. The New York Times cited the presence of Ethiopian snipers, and evidence suggests recruitment extends beyond neighboring countries to include combatants from remote regions.The Colombian government even issued an apology after Colombian media revealed that mercenaries, under false pretenses of employment in the Arab Gulf, found themselves embroiled in the Sudan war. The financial implications of this mercenary involvement are substantial, with estimates suggesting the cost could reach around US$200 billion.

The Shifting Sands of Power: A New Chapter in Sudan’s Conflict

After nearly a year of intense conflict,the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have made significant gains,pushing back the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from key areas,including the capital,Khartoum.Though, the situation remains volatile, with RSF leader Hmeti resorting to new strategies that threaten to further destabilize the region.

Military Setbacks and Guerrilla Tactics

As the SAF gained ground,securing vital roads and corridors,Hmeti’s military position weakened,particularly in the western regions of Kordofan and Darfur. Facing these setbacks, the RSF has reportedly adopted guerrilla tactics, including targeting civilian infrastructure with drone attacks, such as power transformers in cities recently reclaimed by the army. This shift in strategy raises concerns about the potential for prolonged instability and increased civilian suffering.

Moreover, defections within Hmeti’s ranks, including key commanders like “Abu Accra Kekl,” and shifts in tribal allegiances in Darfur and South Kordofan towards the SAF, have further isolated the RSF.

A New Coalition emerges: Parallel Government or Prelude to Secession?

In a dramatic turn, Hmeti is now reportedly seeking to forge a new alliance with political and armed factions, including the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (Northern Bureau) led by Abdul Aziz Alghlu. This coalition, launched from nairobi, aims to establish a new constitution and form a parallel government under RSF control. This move has been met with widespread condemnation from the regional and international community, who fear it could pave the way for a second secession of Sudan.

The formation of a parallel government raises serious questions about the future of Sudan and the potential for further fragmentation.

Analysts question the sustainability of this coalition, citing deep divisions between the parties and the practical challenges of implementation. The move is seen by many as a desperate attempt by Hmeti to regain influence after significant military losses.

Regional Instability: A Powder Keg

Sudan’s crisis unfolds against a backdrop of widespread regional instability. Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, internal conflicts within Eritrea, Al-Shabaab’s persistent attacks in Somalia, and political turmoil in South Sudan, requiring Ugandan intervention, all contribute to a volatile environment. The ongoing conflicts in the Congo and the deteriorating security situation in Chad and the Sahel further exacerbate the situation.

These interconnected crises create a perilous feedback loop, where instability in one country fuels instability in another. Sudan, located at the heart of this turbulent region, is particularly vulnerable.

Sudan is in the center of a turbulent area, like a powder keg…

From Desert Turban to Desperate Measures

The contrast between Hmeti’s earlier pronouncements and his recent actions is stark. In mid-March, he appeared defiant, vowing to remain in the presidential palace. However, just days later, reports emerged of RSF troops fleeing Khartoum via the Jebel Olier Bridge, the last escape route before the SAF seized control.

Shortly after, General Abdel Fatah Burhan, commander of the Army and chairman of the Sovereign Commission, declared the complete liberation of the capital from the RSF from within the Republican Palace.

Hmeti’s Legacy: A Cautionary tale

Hmeti’s rise from obscurity to wealth and power is not unique in Africa, where ethnic and tribal loyalties can be exploited for political and military gain. Analysts argue that the legacy of colonialism and the failure of some African leaders to establish inclusive governance models contribute to this phenomenon.

His story serves as a painful reminder that power built solely on military might and tactical victories,without a strategic vision for the future and the support of the masses,is ultimately unsustainable. The crimes committed in Darfur, which continue to be a source of deep division, cannot be ignored.

Power is not built by strategy alone, but rather any political plan should be integrated with the masses, rather than dominating them by theorizing or by force.

Looking Ahead: The Path to Peace and Stability

As sudan stands at this critical juncture, the path forward remains uncertain. The success of any future peace process will depend on addressing the root causes of the conflict, including historical grievances, economic disparities, and the lack of inclusive governance. The international community must play a constructive role in supporting Sudan’s transition to a stable and democratic future.

Harnessing Heritage: A Cavalry’s Bold Strategy

A unique cavalry team is embarking on a mission to amplify the influence of a nation celebrated for its deep historical roots and vibrant cultural tapestry. This initiative seeks to translate the country’s inherent strengths into tangible power on the global stage.

The Power of Diversity and History

The team’s strategy hinges on the belief that a nation’s history and diversity are not merely symbolic assets, but potent forces that can be strategically deployed. This approach recognizes that cultural richness and historical depth can provide a competitive edge in various arenas, from international relations to economic development.

Consider, such as, the impact of cultural diplomacy. Nations with strong cultural identities frequently enough find it easier to build bridges with other countries, fostering collaboration and mutual understanding. Similarly, a deep understanding of history can inform present-day policy decisions, preventing past mistakes and capitalizing on historical successes.

Challenges and Opportunities

While the potential benefits are significant, the cavalry team faces considerable challenges. Effectively leveraging a nation’s history and diversity requires a nuanced understanding of both its strengths and weaknesses. It also demands a commitment to inclusivity and a willingness to engage with diverse perspectives.

Furthermore, the team must navigate the complexities of the modern world, where traditional notions of power are constantly being challenged and redefined. In an era of globalization and technological disruption, the ability to adapt and innovate is crucial for success.

Looking Ahead

The success of this endeavor will depend on the cavalry team’s ability to effectively communicate its vision, build consensus, and mobilize resources. It will also require a long-term commitment to fostering a culture of innovation and collaboration.

As the team embarks on this ambitious journey, the world will be watching closely to see whether it can successfully harness the power of history and diversity to achieve its goals. the outcome could have significant implications for other nations seeking to leverage their own unique strengths on the global stage.