The Kremlin claims that Russia is “immune” to US President Donald Trump’s sanctions, which blacklist two of its oil majors. What is actually keeping Russian oil afloat is a “shadow fleet” of “ghost” and “zombie” ships that transport millions of barrels of crude, circumventing sanctions, to bargain-hunting buyers around the world.
This fleet has other clients: Iranian ayatollahs, Venezuelan generals and even opportunistic and unscrupulous Western businessmen who care more about profit than the threat to the environment or security and, sometimes, the very freedom of the crews, increasingly abandoned on ships stranded on the high seas for months or even years.
The activity of this secret fleet has skyrocketed since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and its main beneficiary is the Putin regime. Russia uses it not only to smuggle its main export and, in this way, raise funds to finance its “war machine” – as Trump pointed out – but also for “hybrid” espionage and sabotage operations against NATO countries in Europe as well as against the submarine cables and pipelines they use.
Russia is among the world’s top three oil exporters, along with the United States and Saudi Arabia. In 2024, Russia produced about 10% of the world’s oil, according to the US Energy Information Administration.
Before the war in Ukraine, almost all of its seaborne oil exports were carried out by Western, mainly Greek, tankers. Commercial operations were based in Switzerland and insurance was taken out in London.
But now, as many as four in five tankers carrying Russian oil lack insurance recognized by any of the 12 mutual insurance companies of the International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs, which cover about 90% of all maritime cargo, according to estimates by analysts at S&P Global. This suggests that the ghost fleet is currently transporting 80% of Russian oil, defying Western sanctions.
“Russia has created a parallel fleet of oil tankers that allows it to circumvent sanctions,” says Benjamin Hilgenstock, chief economist at the Institute of the Kyiv School of Economics.
“But they are also old, poorly maintained and unlikely to be sufficiently insured against oil spills. Furthermore, approximately three-quarters of Russia’s maritime oil exports must depart from ports in the Baltic and Black Seas, meaning these vessels transit European waters several times a day,” he adds.
Rusty ships sailing under obscure flags
Nearly one in five tankers on the high seas are part of the clandestine fleet, according to S&P: rusty ships that sail under obscure flags to smuggle oil from countries under sanctions.
Of these, 50% transport exclusively Russian oil and derivatives, 20% only Iranian and 10% only Venezuelan; but the remaining 20% are not affiliated with any particular country and transport oil produced by more than one of the sanctioned countries.
The largest, which work for Russia, Iran and Venezuela, sail mainly to India and China, the most populous countries in the world and the largest maritime importers of oil and derivatives.
Smaller buyers of Russian oil include Türkiye, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates.
To hide their tracks, the ships of the ghost fleet:
- They carry out ship-to-ship oil transfers in international waters, where port authority surveillance is less, and sometimes in adverse weather conditions, to conceal the origin of their cargo;
- They deactivate or manipulate their automatic identification system, which transmits data such as position, speed, course, name, flag and type of ship, sometimes falsifying their location so clumsily that they appear to be sailing on land, like the Black Pearl in the Pirates of the Caribbean film saga;
- They become “ghost ships” – hiding ownership data, changing their flag of registration or sailing without a flag, and even changing the name of the vessel several times a month;
- They become “zombie ships,” issuing unique International Maritime Organization registration numbers assigned to ships destined for scrapping, as if using the identity of a deceased person.
The number of false flag vessels increased by at least 65% in the first eight months of 2025, according to the maritime analysis company Windward, which estimates that the clandestine fleet now has 1,300 vessels.
Flag registration services have also seen a boom. Many are simply scams. And while others are technically legal, the issuing countries are new to this sector and lack the will or ability to oversee the use of their flags.
“Under global shipping regulation, flag States are responsible for ensuring compliance with technical standards and adequate oil spill insurance,” says Hilgenstock.
“However, when it comes to the Russian ghost fleet, we are talking about jurisdictions that simply cannot be trusted to carry out this function,” he adds.
Threats to global security
In October 2025, a Benin-flagged oil tanker, suspected of serving as a launch pad for drones that forced the closure of airports in Denmark, was detained off the French coast.
Brest prosecutor Stéphane Kellenberger told Agence France-Presse that the arrest was initially due to the crew’s refusal to cooperate as they could not justify the nationality of the ship.
This is Boracay, which has just changed its previous name, which was Pushpa – it had also been called Odysseus, Varuna and Kiwala – and which has flown seven different flags over time.
When it was intercepted by the French Navy, it was transporting 750,000 barrels of crude oil from the Russian oil terminal of Primorsk, near St. Petersburg, to Vadinar, in India.
Suspicious incursions by Russian drones have also been recorded over the territories of NATO countries such as Sweden, Norway and Germany.
On Thursday, November 6, 2025, Brussels Airport was forced to temporarily close following the sighting of drones in its vicinity and elsewhere, including a military base in Belgium. Russia denies carrying out a “hybrid war” against Ukraine’s allies.
Following the Boracay investigation, NATO countries launched the mission Baltic Sentry. “Ship captains must understand that possible threats to our infrastructure will have consequences, including possible boarding, seizure and arrest,” declared the secretary general of that alliance, Mark Rutte.
The United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden and Poland reported that they are inspecting the insurance documentation of ships sailing through the English Channel, the Danish Straits, the Gulf of Finland, and the Strait between Sweden and Denmark.
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Norway also agreed to “disrupt and deter” the Russian covert fleet in response to several unexplained cable cuts and undersea incidents that have hit critical infrastructure in the Baltic.
However, ghost fleet ships can only be intercepted in port or within territorial waters, a restricted zone of 12 nautical miles from the coast.
In international waters the task is much more difficult, especially since the West is the world’s leading defender of freedom of navigation. Under the principle of “innocent passage”, States can only intercept ships that they consider a threat to their security.
Russian politicians have demanded that any hostile action against tankers carrying Russian oil be considered an attack on Russia. And when Estonia tried to stop a tanker sailing without a flag between Estonia and Finland in May 2025, Moscow sent a fighter jet to fly over it.
But the clandestine fleet could pose an even greater threat to global security.
Major shipping companies usually dispose of a tanker after about 15 years of service. After 25, they are usually scrapped.
However, ships from the parallel fleet are not accepted for scrapping. [debido a las sanciones que pesan en contra de esas embarcaciones].
In December 2024, Russian authorities struggled to contain up to 5,000 tons of oil spilled into the Kerch Strait by two 50-year-old tankers damaged during a severe storm.
A prominent Russian scientist called the spill the worst “environmental catastrophe” of the 21st century in the country. “This is the first time that fuel oil has been spilled in such quantities,” Viktor Danilov-Danilyan, president of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told a Russian newspaper.
Front companies in jurisdictions such as Dubai, some financed by Russian oil companies according to the Financial Timesthey buy vessels at the end of their useful life, destabilizing the market and discouraging investment in new oil tankers.
A quick buying and selling process by anonymous or recently created companies is used to add opacity to the negotiations.
In addition, oil tankers are as poorly maintained as they are regulated, making them prone to mechanical failure and leaks, while broken or switched off transponders (a telecommunications device) increase the risk of collision with other vessels in shallow waters.
However, this high-risk underground business is extremely lucrative.
A 15-year-old Suezmax tanker costs around $40 million, according to Xclusiv Shipbrokers, while, according to S&P, a single month-long voyage transporting Russian oil from the Black Sea to India can net its owner more than $5 million.
Clandestine shipowners pocket the profits while shifting potential losses to the rest of the world, since without insurance, someone else will have to pay for the damages in the event of an accident or oil spill.
Even when sanctions are lifted, this clandestine fleet will continue to sail and will give rise to new versions in other areas of maritime transport.
The outlines of a “Shadow Fleet 2.0” are already visible, according to the trade magazine Lloyd’s List, which cites the example of the Chinese container ship Heng Yang 9, repeatedly sighted on routes between Russian-occupied Ukraine and Istanbul, Turkey.
Additional reporting and editing by Olga Sawczuk, BBC World Service.
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