Thailand’s Struggle: Democratic Reforms in a Hybrid Regime

In the aftermath of the youth-led protests in 2020–21, Thailand is now governed by an elected administration led by Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s coalition government. This coalition includes a mix of royalist, military-linked, and clientelistic parties, under the leadership of the Pheu Thai Party (PTP), a centrist and personalistic party with pro-reform democratic elements. Since May 2023 general elections, youth-led street protests have vanished, and Thailand appears to have entered a period of hybrid regime after a decade of authoritarian rule.

Subtle Repression Under the Surface

Despite appearances of greater stability, Thailand’s social movement sector and party system remain under subtle yet intense repression by establishment forces. These forces view representative politics as a systemic threat and have manipulated representative systems in various ways. Pro-reform and democratic parties, particularly the People’s Party (PP)—the latest incarnation of banned Future Forward and Move Forward parties—face threats of dissolution and selective politician bans by the Constitutional Court.

Many youth movement leaders have been charged under draconian laws like the lèse-majesté law, facing long-term imprisonment and often going into exile. Their activities have been halted, and some leaders have fled the country.

A Historical Struggle

Strong Spirit, Weak Body

Thailand has a long history of struggle between reformist political parties and social movements on one side, and the hegemonic establishment—particularly the monarchy and military—on the other. Since the 1932 revolution, royalist forces have taken measures to suppress democratic associations, leading to a no-party system until 1946. Under regimes like Sarit Thanarat’s (1958–1963), all civic space for representative organizations was eliminated, leaving pro-democracy parties vulnerable.

The October 1976 massacre devastated progressive movements and left-wing parties, contributing to the collapse of democratic associational life. State and royalist repression eroded organizational structures within movements and parties, leading to a clientelistic system that prioritized personal networks over deep societal roots.

Since the 2006 coup, the practice of banning counter-establishment parties has increased. The TRT, led by Thaksin Shinawatra, experienced two bans and saw four of its prime ministers dismissed by the Constitutional Court. The ongoing repression weakened Pheu Thai’s infrastructure, particularly its policy innovation capabilities.

Decades of authoritarianism under the 2014 junta further eroded Pheu Thai’s electoral base and grassroots networks, reducing voter partisanship. The absence of sustained organizing efforts during this period decreased social ties among grassroots networks. The Pheu Thai’s mid-level mobilisational infrastructure, which connected party organizations with rural bases, was effectively repressed, leading to a diminished capacity for mass-based politics.

Each party ban disrupts organizational continuity, requiring time-consuming administrative transitions. Party structures become more deinstitutionalized and smaller, making it harder to establish mass-based parties and leading to an oligarchic decision-making process.

The Political Crisis Post-2023 Elections

The post-2023 elections saw further political instability. The Move Forward Party, which won the most seats, couldn’t form a government coalition with the runner-up, Pheu Thai, due to obstruction by the junta-appointed Senate, leading to political gridlock. This scenario resembled a prisoner’s dilemma, where both parties lost the optimal chance to form a post-authoritarian government.

Confronted with these pressures, Pheu Thai pragmatically formed an unusual alliance with its historic junta rivals. This move signaled a shift from its pro-reform, pro-democratic traditions, leading to uncertainty among its voters.

The coalition’s weak capacity to control its partners and prevent fragmentation hinders policy-making. Pheu Thai struggles to deliver on campaign promises, facing economic challenges and erosion of longtime voter support.

Opportunities Amid Repression

Amidst ongoing repression, movements and parties must prioritize building robust organizational infrastructures and cultivating quality leadership. For the People’s Party, it is crucial to focus on building a mobilisational infrastructure to sustain the social movement sector and its overlapping party network.

Funding scarcity and state repression make it difficult to focus on long-term goals like leadership development or infrastructure building. Activists often prioritize frontline campaign work, failing to recognize the intertwined nature of their infrastructures. Effective long-term success requires recognizing the mutual dependence of parties and movements.

Pheu Thai has established a new task force, the Pheu Thai Academy, to lead institutionalisation efforts, strengthen programmatic positions, build future leaders, and enhance parliamentary work. However, this may not be enough without broader changes in party strategy and leadership.

Party elites often focus on short-term electoral gains, while grassroots activists focus on long-term capacity building. These conflicting strategies can undermine efforts to build strong, democratic political structures.

The People’s Party’s focus on short-term gains conflicts with grassroots efforts to build youth leadership and mobilisational infrastructure. However, these efforts remain underprioritized by the party.

Conclusion: Preparing for Change

In Southeast Asia, authoritarian forces often use democratic facades to conceal their true nature. Hybrid regimes hold elections to present an illusion of democracy while operating autocratically. Regimes like Thailand’s establishment-controlled government or the Tatmadaw in Myanmar aim to mask autocratic rule with democratic legitimacy.

Democratic forces must focus on building strong organisational and mobilisational infrastructures to stand independently and seize opportunities for genuine democratic transitions. Without prioritizing the development of robust structures, movements and parties rarely achieve their goals of democratisation and rights advancement.

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